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    The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) uses
data mining to analyze millions of vendor transactions each
year in an effort to combat fraud.  The long timeline
required to investigate potential fraud precludes DFAS from
using fraud as a supervised modeling performance measure,
so instead it uses the conditions needing improvement (CNI)
found during site audits.  To verify this method, a
thorough literature review is conducted which demonstrates
a clear relationship between fraud and CNIs.  Then recent
site audits are analyzed to prove that supervised modeling
is detecting CNIs at a higher rate than random record
selection.  The next phase of the research evaluates recent
models to determine if models are improving with each new
audit.  Finally, to enhance the supervised modeling
process, four initiatives are proposed: a revised model
scoring implementation, a knowledge base of audit results,
alternative model streams for record selection and a
recommended modeling process for the CNI knowledge base. 
The goal of the proposed enhancements is to improve an
already successful program so that the data-mining efforts
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In an effort to combat fraud, the Defense Finance and
Accounting Service (DFAS) uses data mining to analyze
millions of vendor transactions each year.  The long time
required to go from an audit to investigation and
prosecution precludes DFAS from using fraud as a
performance measure of data-mining success.  Instead, the
conditions needing improvement (CNI) found during site
audits have been used to gauge supervised data-mining model
success.
No detailed analysis had been conducted to demonstrate
the validity of using CNIs to measure performance or to
show the data-mining success with CNIs.  The validity of
using this method is verified by a thorough literature
review which demonstrates a clear link between fraud and
CNIs.  Then the CNI results from the four site audits
conducted during 2001 are analyzed to prove that supervised
modeling is finding CNIs at a higher rate than random
record selection.  Given the demonstrated data-mining
success with CNIs, the next phase of the research evaluates
whether the current modeling process is producing improved
models.  By evaluating recent model scores, it is shown
that models currently being constructed are not improving
over those models produced for previous site audits.
With the modeling process having reached a plateau,
four process improvement areas are explored.  The first
improvement is a reformation of the current model scoring
system.  Changes to both the model development score and
the post-audit score are recommended.  Additionally, the
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model development score calculation is transferred to a
Clementine stream to permit immediate calculation of model
scores.  The next process improvement is the development of
an audit results (CNI) knowledge base, which can be used to
evaluate current model performance as well as generate new
models.  The third process improvement entails a fresh look
at the model ensemble process including an optimized model
ensemble, second-tier classification methods and sequential
record screening.  The final process improvement is a
proposed CNI modeling process that compares and contrasts
CNI modeling to the current fraud modeling.
The goal of this thesis was to determine the success
of data mining and then investigate potential improvements. 
We have shown that data mining is improving the audit
process.  As for improvements, some are presently being
implemented, such as the Clementine scoring stream and CNI
knowledge base, while others will require further
investigation to be fully realized.  The research presented
by this thesis will improve an already successful program
such that the data-mining efforts will further reduce





The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the
supervised data-mining process currently employed by the
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Internal
Review (IR) Seaside.  The current data-mining efforts have
been in place since 1999 following implementation assisted
by an outside contractor, Federal Data Corporation (FDC)
[Ref. 1].  Since that time, a dozen vendor-pay site audits
have been conducted with the assistance of the data-mining
team.  Results from some of these audits have been
collected and maintained in a Microsoft Access database. 
This useful data regarding the audited records may be
regenerated into a knowledge base that can be used in model
evaluation and for future modeling.
B. BACKGROUND.
The IR Seaside Office was originally formed as an
independent investigative team known as Operation Mongoose. 
Mongoose was formed in an effort to stem the seeming flood
of fraud cases that were occurring within the department of
Defense and its disbursing activities.  Oxendine [Ref. 2]
conducted an analysis in 1999 of Department of Defense
(DoD) fraudulent vendor payments and provided a good
overview on the fraud problem that was occurring within DOD
in the 1990’s.
In an attempt to leverage new data-mining technology,
Operation Mongoose developed a data-mining project to
search the vast numbers of DFAS vendor-pay transactions for
potentially fraudulent payments.  Sixteen known cases of
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successfully prosecuted fraud were identified for use by
the team.  The records for these cases were collected and
the associated 453 payments were compiled into a “knowledge
base.”  This knowledge base was analyzed for patterns and
its records were classified into four fraud “types” that
could then be used as a foundation for building supervised
classification and prediction models.
After the inception of the data-mining project, the
Mongoose team was integrated into the DFAS IR team.  As
part of IR, the team conducts data mining on vendor-pay
transactions to provide focused record selection at DFAS
site audits.  The IR teams that visit DFAS sites then
conduct a thorough audit of those records in search of
Conditions Needing Improvement (CNI), overpayments,
duplicate payments or possible fraudulent behavior.  IR
Seaside attends the audits to instruct the auditors about




Is the supervised modeling process improving the site
audits conducted by DFAS IR?
2. Subsidiary Questions:
 a. Is there a relationship between fraud and
CNIs?
 b. Are the records chosen by the data-mining
process more likely to have CNIs than randomly selected
records?
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 c. Is the existing set of models adequate to
build a library of known successful models?
 d. How can model selection be improved by
including feedback from the audit results?
 e. Are there alternative methods available for
selecting supervised records?
 f. Can the audited records database be used as
a knowledge base for future modeling?
D. SCOPE OF THESIS.
The scope of this thesis will include:
1. A review of recent site audit results with the
main focus on the four audits conducted during 2001.
2. A review of supervised model performance and
comparison of audit results on records chosen by supervised
models versus records chosen randomly.
3. Analysis of supervised model selection with an
attempt to feed audit results back into the model selection
and development process.
4. Analysis of methods to implement a model ensemble
using the library of supervised models already built.
The scope of this thesis will not include:
1. The development of new models for DFAS IR.
2. A detailed analysis of the known fraud knowledge
base currently being used to develop supervised models.
3. An analysis of other record selection processes
currently used at DFAS IR.
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4. Construction of models using the CNI knowledge
base.
E. METHODOLOGY.
The methodology used in this study consists of the
following steps:
1. Conduct a search of literature covering audit
processes, fraud detection, data mining, and classification
methods.  This literature review will include journals,
Internet resources, databases, and other library resources.
2 During experience tour at DFAS IR Seaside,
evaluate the supervised modeling process from initial
receipt of site data through the completion of record
selection for auditing.
3. Attend a site audit to gain insight into the
auditing process and to learn how the data-mining efforts
might be focused to improve audits.
4. Collect and analyze data from previous audits.
5. Collect and analyze supervised models.
6. Evaluate the supervised modeling process.

F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY.
This thesis is broken down into five chapters
following the Introduction.  Chapter II introduces DFAS IR
and the techniques used to detect misappropriations and
fraud.  Following this overview, a detailed description of
the supervised data-mining process is provided.  This
discussion steps through the modeling process from the
initial phase of data receipt through the selection of
records for auditing purposes.
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The first part of Chapter III presents an overview of
the issues examined in this thesis.  Following these issues
are the assumptions and hypotheses that this thesis will
attempt to answer.  Finally, the last section introduces
proposals for an improved performance measure, more
effective use of the model library and the creation of a
CNI knowledge base.  Chapter IV begins the analytical phase
of the thesis.  In this chapter, the three hypotheses will
be addressed through literature review and statistical
techniques.  The literature review establishes a
relationship between fraud and CNIs.  The statistical
analyses answer the questions of supervised modeling
success versus random selection and the status of continued
modeling on the fraud knowledge base.
Chapter V is a fresh look at some questions currently
being explored by the data-mining team.  It starts with an
evaluation of the current model scoring function with
recommended changes and a new software implementation.  The
next section describes the compilation of a new knowledge
base of CNI data and possible uses for the data.  Following
that is an analysis of the model ensemble process in which
an optimized ensemble is evaluated along with several novel
ways to utilize ensemble results.  The chapter concludes
with a proposed modeling methodology for the CNI knowledge
base.  Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the conclusions and
recommendations for process improvements.  In addition,
there is discussion on future research ideas associated




G. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS.
The initial benefit of this thesis is that it will
demonstrate the success of the supervised modeling process. 
Additionally, by providing an analysis of the model
library, ensembles are presented that might be used for
future site audits and reduce the time spent on building
new models.  To aid in modeling, improved model performance
measures are developed for incorporation directly into the
modeling process.  Finally, by creating a database of audit
results, the modeling team will have a growing base of
knowledge on which to improve the record selection process. 
Ultimately, this thesis attempts to improve the audit







1. Description of DFAS IR Seaside.
DFAS is the agency that pays most DoD bills from
contracting, travel payments, foreign sales and payroll
disbursements.  DFAS is one of the largest accounting
agencies in the world, disbursing nearly one billion
dollars every business day.  DFAS was formed in January
1991 to eliminate redundant disbursement activities within
the Defense Department.  Prior to DFAS’s inception, there
were 338 accounting and finance offices worldwide.  This
excessive number of redundant systems and personnel cost
the government 3.1 billion dollars per year in fixed
overhead. In addition to this excess overhead, the large
bureaucracy and the lack of standardization left the
Defense Department vulnerable to fraud.  The system has
subsequently been reduced to 26 sites worldwide with
offices in the United States, Japan and Europe. [Ref. 3]
During the early and mid 1990’s there were a number of
fraud cases, discovered mostly by accident, that pointed to
systematic problems in the DoD payment system [Ref. 2]. 
This problem has been continually addressed since that time
with improved internal controls, operational audits and
system standardization. However, more proactive techniques
were needed to show the American people that DoD was
actively fighting fraudulent activity.  In 1994 Congress
created a new unit called Operation Mongoose whose sole
purpose was to develop methods to detect and prevent fraud
[Ref 2].  After several reorganizations, Operation Mongoose
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is now the Seaside branch of DFAS IR, but its focus has not
changed.  Its number one priority is the discovery of
fraudulent or problem payments within DFAS to save the
taxpayers’ money.
Since its debut, DFAS IR Seaside has developed
analytical methods to find problem payments by exploiting
the vast amount of payment information collected
continuously by DFAS.  Its agents work closely with the
Defense Manpower and Data Center (DMDC) agency to gather
pertinent data for analysis.  IR Seaside assists the audit
process with data analysis by searching for problem
transactions such as duplicate payments, overpayments and
fraud.  The synergy developed by tying together these
multi-agency functions has resulted in millions of dollars
in duplicate payments being recovered, the initiation of
fraudulent payment investigations, and the improved ability
of auditors to identify conditions needing improvement at
DFAS payment centers. [Ref. 4]
2. Literature Review.
Fraudulent payments are a problem not only within DoD,
but also in practically all private and public
institutions.  A review of recent auditing literature finds
numerous instances of fraud.  Even in the daily news, one
of the biggest stories of 2002 has been the collapse of
Enron Corporation and the irregularities inherent in its
auditing system.  The overarching question is how to
identify and prevent fraud by using the analytical tools
available to the auditor.
Looking outside of DoD and into the private sector,
detection of fraud is one of the primary responsibilities
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of the professional auditor.  The Statement of Auditing
Standards (SAS) Number 82 is titled Consideration of Fraud
in a Financial Statement Audit.  SAS 82 details the
responsibility of auditors to take action when they detect
potentially fraudulent behavior during the conduct of an
audit [Ref. 5].  To assist them in the auditing process,
auditors are also required to use analytical procedures
(APs) in the preparation, conduct and post-review of audits
as outlined in SAS 8 [Ref. 6] and SAS 56 [Ref. 7]. 
Combining the various SAS requirements, it seems only
natural that auditors would develop APs to assist in fraud
detection.
Have private auditors had any success with their use
of APs in detecting problem payments?  Wheeler and Pany
[Ref. 8] point out that studies using an ex post facto
approach show that APs find numerous problems and should be
applied more frequently.  Busta and Weiberg [Ref. 9]
demonstrate improved fraud auditing effectiveness using
APs, specifically concluding that neural networks can be a
valuable aid in the auditor’s AP toolkit.  Calderon and
Green [Ref. 10] conduct a detailed review of accounting
literature and show that APs used in fraud determination
account for 16 to 40 percent of all findings in actual
audit results.  Apparently, private auditors are having
success when using APs.
The use of APs to detect fraud is also an issue being
addressed within other government agencies.  The United
States General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a study of
the techniques used by government agencies to detect or
prevent fraud and improper payments.  The study cites a
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number of activities that are using data mining to detect
abnormalities.  For instance, the Illinois Department of
Public Aid applies data-mining techniques to detect
fraudulent billing and kickback schemes.  Another case
cited reveals how the Texas Health and Human Services
Commission is using neural networks to identify fraudulent
claims.  The Texas commission successfully identified over
six million dollars for recovery in fiscal year 2000.  The
GAO also reports on a number of other institutions and the
data-mining techniques that are currently being used in
fraud detection efforts. [Ref. 11]
With the recent focus on information technology, many
agencies and corporations have spent millions of dollars to
construct databases and implement data-mining activities. 
Is the effort really worth the cost?  According to another
GAO report, twelve government agencies required to report
improper payments had estimated over sixteen billion
dollars in improper payments as a result of operations
during fiscal year 1999.  Comparing the cost of millions of
dollars to conduct data-mining efforts against the loss of
billions of dollars makes the effort seem like a reasonable
investment if even a small proportion of those lost dollars
can be recovered. [Ref. 12] 
B. DESCRIPTION OF IR SEASIDE’S DATA MINING.
1. Overview of IR Seaside Analytical Procedures.
IR Seaside currently conducts several different
analytical techniques to identify problem payments.  Before
each site audit, the preceding eighteen months of site data
is compiled for analysis.  The IR audit coordinator decides
how many records each selection method will screen for
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detailed auditing with a typical breakdown including 30%
duplicate payments, 30% supervised records, 10%
unsupervised records, 20% related records, and 10% random
records.  Below is a brief description to enlighten the
reader on the techniques used to identify records for
further review.
a. Duplicate Payments.
Duplicate payments are payments made to a
contractor, under a valid contract, that have already been
paid at least once before.  To identify duplicate payments
the IR Seaside team evaluates all payments made at a DFAS
site.  This technique is initially computer-intensive in
the comparison of all records with specific matching rules
developed by the IR auditors.  Site records are pairwise
compared and several new record fields are generated.  The
new fields indicate whether a record shares common traits
with another record in the database.  If two records are
nearly identical then they are flagged as potential
duplicates.  The second phase of the process entails an IR
review of the flagged records.  The Seaside auditors apply
their experience to determine which records deserve
attention during the upcoming site visit.  Duplicate
payments have been the most productive and visible aspect
of the IR data-mining work with over $75 million dollars
recovered to date [Ref. 4].
b. Supervised Modeling.
This technique is covered in more detail
throughout the thesis.  Described simply, the data-miners
use a knowledge base of fraud to build predictive models. 
The underlying premise is that patterns in the fraud
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knowledge base can be identified and exploited to predict
potential fraud in the site data.
c. Unsupervised Modeling.
Unsupervised modeling is a comprehensive heading
for all other modeling techniques used at DFAS that are not
supervised.  Some techniques used to date include
clustering and pseudo-supervised/clustering.  Additionally,
some unsupervised records are chosen using subsets of the
supervised modeling ensembles.  This area of modeling is in
its infancy at DFAS IR, is continually undergoing changes
with each new site audit and could benefit significantly
from further analysis.
d. Related Payments.
Related payments are records that are “related”
to the records selected by the supervised models.  When the
supervised modeling process selects a record, a DMDC query
then finds all other records related to the suspect record
in the fields of payee, contract, address, or EFT number. 
All the related records are documented and the information
is brought to the site audit.  The related records may or
may not be reviewed during the site audit depending on
whether the audit reveals problems with its associated
supervised record or if the data-mining team deems the
record to be interesting.
e. Random Records.
Random record selection has been the traditional
means of choosing records for DFAS audits.  IR Seaside
accomplishes random selection by assigning each record a
random number from one to the number of records.  The
records are then sorted by this random number and the top
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records are selected until the desired number of records is
obtained.
2. In-depth Review of Supervised Modeling.
In order to understand the implications of the
analyses conducted in this thesis, it is important for the
reader to understand the supervised modeling process. 
Figure 1 outlines the key stages from initial site data
reporting until the audit list of records is presented to
the site.  The remainder of Chapter II outlines the process
from the development of the underlying knowledge base
through the selection of records for an audit.
Figure 1.   Record Selection Process Flowchart
 
Site reports vendor 
payments to DMDC 
DMDC compiles 18 
months of site data 
DMDC generates field 
transformations 
DFAS reviews data, 
generates review sheet





and Duplicate Record 
Selection 
DFAS scores models in 
spreadsheet 
Models are selected and 
ensemble built 
Supervised records are 
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records for audit 
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a. Description of Fraud Knowledge Base.
The ultimate source of fraud knowledge used to
generate supervised models comes from a knowledge base of
prosecuted fraudulent activity.  This knowledge base
consists of 453 transactions from 16 known fraud cases.  At
the beginning of the data-mining program, these cases were
collected from DMDC or from the actual transaction records. 
The data was analyzed using principal component analysis
along with clustering techniques to group the payments for
easier classification. [Ref. 1]  This resulted in the
fraudulent payments being broken into four fraud “types”
for modeling purposes.  These types were labeled as Big
Systematic (BigSys), Small Systematic (SmallSys),
Opportunistic (Ops), and Piggyback (Piggy).  Because there
were only 453 fraudulent payments, the analysts wanted the
data to be utilized to its fullest extent.  Therefore, the
data was partitioned into eleven “splits” for model
development in a way similar to a cross-validation scheme. 
Each split contains all 16 cases divided into three subsets
in such a way that each subset contains transactions from
each fraud type.  These subsets are used for training, test
and validation phases of model development explained later. 
b. Site Data Review and Preparation.
As with any application, it is important to
verify data integrity before analysis.  Prior to modeling
on any site data, the statistical information for each
field is compiled and reviewed by the senior data-miner. 
That review includes looking for interesting traits such as
negative date comparisons, missing data, implausible
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entries and other abnormalities.  The head data-miner then
releases a comprehensive spreadsheet with recommendations
as to which fields to avoid or to use in model development. 
Serious data integrity issues are reported to DMDC so the
responsible site can be informed of the data entry problems
that need to be addressed at the site.
In preparing the data, DMDC generates three
subsets of data for each split: training, test and
validation.  The training set is used to construct models,
which are then tested using the test set and evaluated
using the validation set.  Each of the eleven splits of
fraud data is combined with a random sample of site records
to create eleven test sets and eleven training sets.  Each
training set contains 4000 presumed nonfraud records from
the site plus fraud records from the split.  The test sets
are similar, with 2000 site records and attached fraud
split data.  Finally, one set of nonfraud data for the
validation set, consisting of ten percent of the site data,
is used for all models.  DMDC returns a Common Data Format
(CDF) file that contains all the sets of data for modeling. 
This file is composed of eleven test sets, eleven training
sets, eleven sets of fraud data for validation and one set
of nonfraud data for validation.
c. Model Building Process.
After the Access database is delivered for model
construction, the workload is distributed among the data-
miners.  Each split is assigned to an individual who will
build a number of models to predict potential fraud in the
site data.  The splits are distributed differently for each
site to preclude modelers becoming too split-specific in
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their model development.  Therefore, each modeler analyzes
all the fraud data over several audits and a more robust
model library is developed.
To build classification networks, the data-miners
use the software package Clementine 6.5.  Clementine offers
a number of classification methods including classification
and regression trees (with the C5.0 and C&RT algorithms),
linear regression, logistic regression, and neural
networks.  The data-mining efforts have primarily used
classification trees for their ease of understanding and
neural networks for their ease of use. [Ref. 13] 
The next step in the model-building process is
model development.  The miners build classification trees
and neural nets using the splits assigned to them.  The
miners apply their audit experience from previous site
data-mining efforts to develop what they consider the best
models.  Each modeler will build at least three models per
split, and then enter the test and validation results into
an Excel spreadsheet for scoring.
d. Scoring Process.
When the data-mining project began, the analysts
lacked feedback regarding the effectiveness of their
models.  Therefore, they designed an ad hoc scoring
function that has been in use ever since.  The scoring
process is briefly explained here with a more detailed
analysis included in Chapter V. [Ref. 14]
After building a satisfactory model on the
training data, the modelers run the test and validation
datasets through the model.  The result is contingency
tables with counts distributed by rows of known fraud
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status and columns of predicted fraud status for the test
and validation sets.  One major assumption is made when
applying the known fraud label: that none of the sampled
site data is fraudulent.  Given the large number of
payments and the belief that most payments are not
fraudulent, this assumption is reasonable.  The Clementine
contingency tables are then manually transferred to an
Excel spreadsheet.  The model scores are calculated by
Excel and consist of a weighted nonlinear utility function
discussed in detail in Chapter V.  All the model results
are posted to a single spreadsheet to allow model
comparison.  The scores are then used as an objective
factor in the subjective selection of models for the site’s
supervised ensemble.
e. Model Ensembles.
The next phase is to have all the models classify
all the records in the site database.  Models are selected
based on the objective score along with the intent to
evenly distribute splits, modelers and classification
methods.  The model team constructs a model ensemble made
up of an odd number of models (recent sites used 11
models).  The models are then built into a Clementine final
voting stream and records are selected using a simple
majority-voting scheme similar to that used in bagging
[Ref. 15].
f. Record Selection for Audits.
With the modeling process complete, the entire
eighteen-month database of site records is run through the
model ensemble.  Each model classifies each record and the
predicted fraud classifications for each record are
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counted.  A true simple majority-voting scheme would
classify all records that receive a majority vote as
potentially fraudulent and worth review.  However, audit
team resources and time are limited, so only a fixed number
of records can be selected.  The team knows beforehand how
many records can be reviewed, so they evaluate the ensemble
results and chose a vote cutoff that returns approximately
this many records.  At the Dayton 2002 audit, eight out of
eleven models was the cutoff due to an audit limit of
approximately 140 supervised records.  One problem with
this selection method is that as the voting cutoff
increases, voting blocs may become more dominant.  Possible
alternative methods are discussed in Chapter V.
g. Audit Preparation.
Records selected by the different techniques are
referred to as candidates.  The data-mining team sends the
candidate list back to DMDC.  DMDC then prepares and
returns a list of the candidates and any related records to
DFAS IR.  Approximately two weeks prior to the site visit,
DFAS IR forwards the candidate list to the audit site so
that the records’ documentation can be prepared for




Data mining at DFAS IR has progressed to the point
where the staff are efficient at data review, modeling and
record selection.  “Quick-look” subjective measures have
been used to evaluate the success of their work, but no one
has conducted a detailed analysis.  This thesis is an
attempt to objectively review the supervised data-mining
efforts and to introduce possible process improvements
At first glance, one would think that a valid
determination of the data-mining effectiveness would be the
positive identification of fraud.  However, because of the
long time required between identifying potentially
fraudulent records, investigation and prosecution, this
performance measure is impractical.  For this reason, the
idea of using fraud detection as a performance measure of
proactive fraud auditing is not seen as valid in the
auditing literature.  In his comprehensive book on
proactive fraud auditing, Howard Davia resoundingly rejects
fraud detection as a performance measure because of the
historical difficulty of prosecuting fraud [Ref. 16].  He
points out that proactive fraud auditing's greatest
strength lies not in its ability to detect fraud, but more
in its deterrent aspects.  Unable to adequately measure
success in detecting fraud, IR Seaside must develop another
measure of effectiveness.  This thesis’s research will show
data mining’s effectiveness through review of prior audits,
as well as develop more useful scoring measures and explore
improvements to the current procedures.
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B RESEARCH QUESTIONS.
1. Is There a Relationship Between Fraud and CNIs?
The measure used to evaluate the data-mining process
to date has been the models’ capability to identify CNIs
during site audits.  This seems appropriate at first
glance, but it may not really address the underlying issue
of finding fraud.  The assumption has been made that a
relationship exists between fraud and CNIs.  To demonstrate
this assumption statistically would encompass an entire
thesis by itself.  Therefore, to validate this assumption,
we will not conduct statistical tests, but rather cite
research that has demonstrated the relationship between
record deficiencies and fraud.
2. Are There More CNIs in Supervised Records Than in
Records Selected Randomly?
If the answer to question one above is correct then
the supervised records should have a higher proportion of
CNIs than the random records.  Fortunately, the audits have
included a random selection of records that have been
reviewed.  A comparison of the two methods’ CNI findings
will demonstrate the effectiveness of supervised modeling. 
In validating this assumption, a hypothesis test will be
performed on the CNI/non-CNI findings for both supervised
and random records at the four most recent site audits.
3. Is the Current Modeling Process Creating Improved
Models?
Many hours and dollars have been spent in developing
hundreds of models on a common knowledge base of fraud.  Is
it proper to assume that new patterns are still being
identified in the data using the same classification
methods?  If that is not the case, then building more of
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the same types of models on the same data may be pointless. 
A comparison of model scores will determine if the process
is improving or stagnating.
C. PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS.
1 Analyze and Simplify Model Evaluation.
The current scoring process requires the manual
transfer of approximately 100 values from Clementine
contingency tables to an Excel spreadsheet.  This process
has a number of disadvantages.  The first entails the
design of the Excel spreadsheet and scoring function.  Even
though the DFAS modelers provided input, the contractors
failed to document the function, which means that the
modelers do not fully comprehend the spreadsheet’s inner
workings.  Additionally, the manual transfer of data is
time consuming and ripe for data entry errors which may
result in miscalculated scores.  Finally, because the
scores are not readily available, miners lack immediate
feedback on model performance when constructing models.
Following audit completion the team determines model
success differently than during the model development
phase.  Each model is evaluated based on the percentage of
records classified as potential fraud by the model that
were subsequently identified as CNIs.  This measure
completely neglects to evaluate model performance on the
records classified as potential non-fraud.  This
information is important and should be included in any
performance measure.
It appears that there are two distinct scoring
problems, but a closer look shows that a measure should be
developed that can be used before and after audits.  If
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such a measure is applied then the post-audit model
performance can be related, at least indirectly, to the
model development score.  It is desirable to determine
successful model characteristics and integrate those traits
into new models.
Finally, by understanding the current scoring process,
it may be possible to calculate scores within Clementine. 
If the scores were calculated immediately while modeling
then the data-miner would receive instant feedback. 
Additionally, having scores available in Clementine will
reduce the problem of transcription errors because the
final score information would be already compiled and ready
for transfer to a spreadsheet.
2. Create a CNI Knowledge Base.
If all the patterns in the fraud knowledge base have
been found using the current methods, then what is the next
step?  Adding new fraud cases could enhance the fraud
knowledge base.  IR Seaside is working with investigative
services to obtain new fraud cases and will continue to
pursue that effort.  Another option, presuming that CNIs
are related to fraud, is to develop the audit results into
a knowledge base.  Using CNIs will offer several
advantages.  The first is that the records in the current
fraud knowledge base occurred before electronic
transactions were popular, so the knowledge base is missing
valuable transaction fields.  In addition, after each
audit, IR Seaside returns with that site’s audit results in
their database.  This means that the CNI knowledge base
could be continually growing with new audit results, which
include both CNI and non-CNI findings.
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3. Provide Improved Model Ensemble Options.
With the process validated by proving the hypotheses
above, the next step is to find ways to improve the
ensemble process.  With a growing knowledge base of CNIs,
the potential exists to build ensembles based on their
ability to detect CNIs, thereby providing a means of
exploiting the hundreds of models in the library.  The
models used at the sites can now be evaluated on their
real-world classification success, which can then be
integrated back into building model ensembles.  Several
methodologies will be explored here including best model
combinations, ensemble optimization, sequential screening
and second-tier classification.
4. Recommended CNI Modeling.
With the potential for an ever-growing database of
CNIs, the opportunity for a new modeling path exists. 
Presuming a link between fraud and CNIs, the modelers can
build new prediction models to find CNIs.  Although this
method will have much in common with the fraud detection
process, there are significant differences.  The assumption
of all site payments as nonfraud cannot be used with CNIs. 
Historically, there have been a significant number of CNIs
at all sites.  Additionally, the detailed analysis
performed on the fraud knowledge base has not been
performed on CNIs.  This means that there may be
undiscovered patterns within the CNI knowledge base that
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IV. PROCESS EVALUATION
A. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRAUD AND CNIS.
The current process assumes the existence of a
relationship between fraud and CNIs.  The data-mining
modelers use the fraud knowledge base to build fraud
prediction models.  However, the audit team does not search
strictly for fraud.  The primary focus of an audit is to
find problems with the documentation, which are then
recorded as CNIs and may be indicative of deeper problems
such as fraud.  The obvious question one must ask is
whether there is a relationship between fraud and CNIs.
IR Seaside evaluates model performance on CNI
identification because of the need to demonstrate to
management how data-mining efforts are improving the
auditing process.  However, no objective analysis has shown
that this relationship actually exists.  Such an analysis
would produce enough material to fill an entire thesis by
itself.  Consequently, we do not attempt a detailed
analysis of that relationship.  The accounting literature
contains numerous articles that demonstrate the
relationship between fraud and faulty documentation and
that will be used as evidence to verify the base assumption
of a fraud/CNI relationship.
Nita Crowder provides a quick overview of computer use
for fraud detection in her article “Fraud Detection
Techniques.” [Ref. 17]  She discusses personal audit
experiences and highlights techniques of data analysis that
helped her discover fraud.  Included in her analysis
toolkit are simple techniques such as filtering data for
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large purchases, comparing vendor addresses to employee
addresses, and checking payments which are slightly below
management approval level.  She also discusses
sophisticated techniques such as neural networks, expert
systems and Benford’s Law.  Many of these techniques are
also used at DFAS to find problems within payment
documentation.  The conclusion of her article points to a
connection between documentation problems and fraud which
helps validate our assumption.
In “Internal Fraud Leaves its Mark,” Calderon cites
research involving fraud detection. [Ref. 18]  The
article’s most interesting point is the breakdown of how
fraud cases were initially detected.  The most common
indicator of fraud was improper documentation, which was
represented in 39% of the cases researched.  In other
words, the documentation had conditions not in accordance
with procedures.  These are precisely the conditions known
as CNIs at DFAS.  The author outlines the connection
between fraud, internal controls and documentation.  In an
organization with strong internal controls there are fewer
documentation errors.  For our purposes, it can be
concluded that when CNIs are observed, the internal
controls have failed and the potential for fraud is
increased.  Once again, this article suggests an underlying
relationship between CNIs and fraud.
The next article proceeds beyond the link between
fraud and CNIs and explains how this relationship can be
used in detailed analysis.  In their article “Signaling
Fraud by using Analytical Procedures,” Calderon and Green
explain how the relationship between fraud and
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misstatements can be used in fraud detection. [Ref. 19] 
They cite previous studies and stress one example where 40%
of all errors encountered by auditors were identified using
APs.  Additionally, they point out numerous studies where
APs identified a significant portion of misstatements
during audits.
In evaluating these articles, in addition to those
presented in Chapter II, it becomes apparent that three
assumptions are held in the auditing profession.  The first
is that documentation problems are associated with fraud in
a significant number of the cases identified.  The second
is that finding the problem documentation will help
auditors find or prevent fraud.  The third is that APs can
be used to detect documentation problems and thereby detect
fraud.  By applying the logic of these three assumptions,
it is completely reasonable to evaluate the fraud model
detection performance by comparing audit CNI results. 
Therefore, the assumption of a relationship between fraud
and CNIs appears valid and it is now acceptable to proceed
with the remaining hypotheses of this chapter.
B. SUPERVISED MODELS FIND CNIS.
Having shown a link between fraud and CNIs, the next
step is to determine how well the model ensembles are
finding CNIs.  Fortunately, the data-mining team has
included a random selection of records in its audits. 
Using the random and supervised records it is a simple
matter to compare the two methods.  If the ensembles are
successfully finding CNIs, then one would expect that the
percentage of records with CNIs in the supervised sample
would be larger than in the random sample.  Figure 2 shows
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the comparison of CNI findings for supervised versus random












































Figure 2.   Supervised Versus Random CNI Findings
It is apparent that at each site the supervised
records have a larger percentage of success at discovering
CNIs.  To verify this difference, a Mantel-Haenszel Test is
used on the four sites’ data.  Table 1 is a breakdown of
the data presented in Figure 2.  The data in this table has
fixed row margins because the numbers of supervised and
random records is established prior to an audit.  However,
the column margins are random because CNI assignments are
unknown when the records are selected.  Therefore, as
discussed by Conover [Ref. 20], the test statistic applied













Supervised 69 118 169 52 16 42 53 44
Random 7 23 63 40 13 37 16 34
Table 1.   Supervised Versus Random Results for Four Sites
The null and alternative hypotheses are:
Ho: p1i ≤ p2i   for all sites i
Ha: p1i ≥ p2i   for all i and p1i > p2i for some i
where:
p1i – probability record at site i has a CNI when 
chosen by supervised technique.

p2i - probability record chosen at site i has a CNI 
when chosen by random sampling.

The alternative hypothesis for this test is upper-
tailed because we presume that the supervised modeling is
finding more CNIs per record than random selection. 
Therefore, the alternative hypothesis states that
supervised selection is at least as good as random
selection for each site, with supervised being better at
least once.  Although these site populations are finite in
size, they are large enough to neglect the finite
population correction.  Each site’s table is separated into
the variables shown in Table 2 for use in the test
statistic calculation.  The subscript i represents the






 Col 1 Col 2 Row Margins
Row 1 xi ri-xi ri
Row 2 ci-xi Ni-ri-ci+xi Ni-ri
Column Margins ci Ni-ci Ni
   
Table 2.   Variable Definitions for Mantel-Haenszel Test
The test statistic equations are shown in Equations 1,
2 and 3:































The calculation details for the Mantel-Haenszel test
are found in Appendix A.  The test statistic calculation
results in Z=3.82, which results in a p-value=0.000067 when
compared to a standard normal distribution.  This provides
strong evidence that at these four sites the supervised
technique would find at least as many, or more, CNIs than
the random selection process with at least one site finding
significantly more.
C. THERE IS AN ADEQUATE LIBRARY OF MODELS.
The data-mining team has assembled hundreds of models
since program inception, applying the same techniques and
algorithms on the fraud knowledge base with minor changes
for each site.  The only thing that significantly changes
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with each new site audit is the use of that site’s data as
nonfraud.  When developing the models to detect fraud, the
fraud input does not change.  More than 300 models have
been developed, with 52 unique models actually being used
at the four sites analyzed in this thesis.
Given that there is a large model library available,
is the modeling effort efficiently focusing the data-
miners’ work?  Assuming that each modeler builds three to
five new models for each site, then there are 20 to 30 new
models created every audit.  The creation of a base model
takes about 10 to 20 hours for a modeler.  The modeler’s
remaining models are typically spin-offs of the base model. 
The result is that each modeler spends about 30 to 40 hours
developing new models for each site.  Some quick arithmetic
with rough numbers for one site shows:
Hours per modeler – 40 hours/site
Modeler salary per hour – 50 dollars/hour
Number of modelers – 6
Cost per site = $50*40*6 = $12,000
Once again these are rough numbers, but they make the
point that approximately $12,000 is being spent to develop
new models for each audit.  This is a rather expensive
proposition given that models are being built with roughly
the same fields and using the same techniques as the models
in the library.  If the models are getting better, then one
could argue that this cost is justified.  However, if
models are improving marginally, or not at all, then the
efforts of the data-miners may be better utilized in other
activities.  In that case, the current library of models
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could be harnessed to generate prebuilt ensemble streams. 
These prebuilt model ensembles would not require new model
development, while their use may result in practically no
loss in audit effectiveness.
Determining whether the models are improving is a
difficult task.  Many approaches can be taken given the
assumptions that are made.  To check for improvement here,
the following criteria are used to develop a test strategy.
• Only models built specifically for a site are
representative of that site’s modeling effort.
• Model development scores that are currently used
to rate models are an accurate indication of a
model’s worth.
The model scores for each site are shown in Table 3. 
Scores are on a scale from 0-600 and are explained in
greater detail in Chapter V.  There were seven models built
specifically for Oakland, while the remaining sites each









589.67 552.93 568.78 565.98
584.96 552.93 558.47 545.05
558.46 533.00 550.19 536.53
553.07 529.98 539.84 535.38
547.19 528.85 530.09 534.22
545.70   
530.63   
Table 3.   Model Scores for Specific Sites in 2001
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) test is inappropriate
because the ANOVA test assumptions are not met.  The
samples do not appear to come from normal distributions and
they have different variances between sites.  Unable to
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meet two of the basic assumptions of an ANOVA, the next
option explored is a rank test.  The test chosen here is
the Kruskal-Wallis test because it allows for comparing
multiple 2x2 contingency tables, while assuming only that
the different population distributions have the same shape. 
The hypothesis test is therefore [Ref. 20]:
Ho: All of the site score population distribution
functions are identical
Ha: At least one of the populations tends to yield
larger observations than at least one of the other
populations
The description of the test statistic and equations
are shown below.
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i = site {1,...,k}
j = model
R(Xij) = the rank order of model j from site i
ni = number of models at site i
N = total number of models

The detailed results of the Kruskal-Wallis test are
located in Appendix A for the interested reader.  The χ2
statistic calculation resulted in χ2=4.12.  When compared to
a chi-squared distribution with three degrees of freedom
this results in a p-value=0.25.  This implies that there is
insufficient evidence to suggest that the model score
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distributions are different between sites.  This in turn
suggests that the model scores are not generally improving
with each new site.  Figure 3 shows the score distributions
in chronological order from earliest site examined to most





















Figure 3.   Boxplot of Scores From Four Sites
D. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS.
Here we summarize the analyses performed in this
chapter.  To start, a discussion of auditing literature
showed a relationship between fraud and CNIs.  This means
that the current procedure of evaluating model success by
IR Seaside is acceptable. Next, the results of previous
audits were analyzed to prove that supervised data mining
is improving the audit process.  Records selected by
supervised models have, on average, more CNIs than randomly
selected records.  This means that for future audits, DFAS
IR would be better served if IR Seaside provided record
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selection for all vendor-pay audits.  Finally, the last
analysis showed the supervised modeling process is not
creating models that are improving with each new site
audit.  This suggests that the modelers have mined the
fraud knowledge base to exhaustion using the current
techniques.  If this is the case, then the modeling process
needs to proceed with different analysis techniques, add
more fraud cases to the knowledge base, or use alternative
means to model such as a CNI database.  Ideas to improve






























A. PERFORMANCE MEASURE EVALUATION.
Presently, IR Seaside uses an ad hoc scoring function
in Excel developed during the data-mining program’s
inception.  This spreadsheet implementation has been
problematic in several ways.  First, it requires manual
transfer of approximately 100 numbers for each model built
in Clementine.  This data transfer is time-intensive and
error-prone, requiring approximately ten man-hours per
site.  Additionally, scores are calculated when models are
submitted for review and the modeling phase is essentially
complete.  Because the objective score is not readily
available, modelers must go with gut instincts when
building and choosing models.  Finally, the initial model
scores are not comparable to the performance measure used
following an audit.  There is no direct link to compare
models from start to finish.  All these areas require
improvement to smooth model evaluation from initial
development through audit completion.
This section attempts to evaluate the current scoring
criteria used throughout a model’s lifetime.  The present
scoring methods will be examined to determine their
inherent strengths and weaknesses, while also exploring
alternative methods.  Table 4 briefly outlines the current
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Table 4.   Comparison of Actual and Proposed Model Scoring
1. Current Scoring Function.
All the data used in the scoring functions can be
summarized in the 2x2 contingency table shown in Table 5.
  Predicted
  Fraud Not Fraud
Fraud a b
Actual
Not Fraud c d
Table 5.   Contingency Table of Voting Results
The model development scoring function uses the two
ratios in Equations 6 and 7.  The first is the sensitivity
rate, which is the percentage of known fraudulent records
classified as fraud.  The second is the false alarm rate,
which is the percentage of nonfraud records classified as
fraud.




[7]     cFalse Alarm
c d
= + 
Each test and validation run consists of payment and
case results.  This results in the creation of four
contingency tables when evaluating a model during the
development phase.  When calculating the ratios by payment
each transaction is treated as an individual entity.  When
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calculating the ratios by case, if any record of a given
case is classified as fraud, then the entire case is
identified as fraud.  There are varying numbers of fraud
cases (as discussed in Chapter 2) and nonfraud cases
depending on the dataset.  The four sets of ratios used to
determine the score are shown in Table 6.  The scoring
function is presented below with the current weights shown
in brackets. [Ref. 1]
Indices
i – Data type {p-payment, c-case}
j – Model run {t-test, v-validation}
k – Model parameter {s-sensitivity, f-false alarm}

Input Data
wi –    Case/Payment Weight       {wc = 0.3, wp = 0.7}
wj –    Test/Validate Weight      {wt = wv = 0.5}
wk –    Parameter Type Weight     {ws = 1, wf = 5}
Gain -  Scale Scores from 0-600   {Gain = 100}
Power – Exponential factor        {Power = 2}

Model Parameters
Sij – Sensitivity of data type i for model run j
Fij – False Alarm Rate of data type i for model run j

Intermediate Variables
Score - Combined score used in rankings
Score Equations
[8]   
,
( (1 ) )Power Poweri j s ij f ij
i j
Score Gain ww w S w F= +∑ − 












[11]    ∑ =
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   Payment (i = p) Case (i = c)
   Predicted Predicted
   Fraud Nonfraud Fraud Nonfraud
Fraud apt bpt act bctTest
(j = t) Nonfraud cpt dpt cct dct









Nonfraud cpv dpv ccv dcv
Table 6.   Contingency Tables Representing the Four Data Runs
Used in Model Development Score
A brief discussion of the scoring function is in
order.  When misclassification rates are low, the
incremental changes per misclassification are larger due to
the squaring of the sensitivity and false alarm rates. 
However, as more misclassifications are made, there is a
smaller score decrease per misclassification.  This forces
modelers to work harder to improve model scores at higher
values.
Another key point is the use of sensitivity and false
alarm rates in the calculation.  There are 2000 nonfraud
payments compared to about 200 fraud payments in the test
set.  This disparity is more severe in the validation set
where nonfraud payments include 10% of all site data.  This
means a difference between numbers of fraud and nonfraud
payments of several orders of magnitude, which would
overwhelm the fraud payments.  Using the sensitivity and
false alarm rates reduces the fraud and nonfraud
classifications to the same scale.
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The weights are another vital part of the score.  The
Test/Validate weights give equal weighting to the two data
sets, which may lead to overfitting the data because the
test set is iteratively used during model development.  The
Case/Payment weights value the payment ratios by more than
twice the case ratios.  This was done because the modelers
felt that the cases should have an effect on the score, but
that the cases were not as important as the individual
payments.  Finally, the parameter type weight gives false
alarms five times more significance than the sensitivity. 
The original purpose for this breakdown was to limit the
misclassification of nonfraud records to minimize excessive
record selection and wasted time auditing records.  The
value of six as the weight sum appears to be arbitrarily
selected by the contractors and presumably holds no
significance.
The typical score for “good models” is in the 500 to
570 range.  Models scoring lower are usually discarded and
very few models score higher.  The current parameter
weights (wk) significantly affect the scores because the
false alarm weight is five times the sensitivity weight. 
If only one model were used to screen records, then it
might be desirable to minimize the false alarm rate to
reduce the number of records selected for audit review. 
However, the modelers use an ensemble and it will be shown
later in the chapter why it is more important for models to





2. Possible Alternative Scoring Functions.
There are alternatives to this scoring function.  Is
it more beneficial to completely replace the current
function or just make adjustments?  This is an important
question, so the first step is to research literature on
classification.  Hand’s work on classification rules [Ref.
21] and his combined work with Mannila and Smyth on data
mining [Ref. 22] are excellent sources for initial
investigation.
According to Hand, the most popular performance
measure is error rate or misclassification rate [Ref. 21]. 
Simply put, error rate is the percentage of records
misclassified in a dataset.  However, one problem with
simple error rate on a 2x2 contingency table is that it
fails to address differences in the severity of the two
misclassification types.  In the accounting literature,
these two types of misclassification are referred to as
Type I and Type II error [Ref. 23].  Referring to Table 5,
the error rates are calculated as follows:
[14]     cpe I
a b c d
= + + +Ty 
[15]     bpe II
a b c d
= + + +Ty 
[16]      Error Rate Type I Type II= +  
When using simple error rate, the question arises as
to which type of error is more significant.  If it were
important to reduce the number of false positives that must
be audited, then one would want to minimize Type I error. 
Conversely, if it were more important to identify all the
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fraud, then one would want to minimize Type II error.  At
DFAS, the number of known fraud payments is substantially
smaller than the number of nonfraud payments.  Using simple
error rates would allow nonfraud payments to overwhelm the
fraud payments.  In that instance, models that always
classify every record as nonfraud would perform well
because they would properly classify over 90% of the
payments.  However, because finding fraud is the purpose of
the data-mining efforts, simple error rates seem
inappropriate as a scoring function.
Another scoring option involves using only half of
Table 5.  This approach is currently used following site
audits in which the rows of Table 5 change to known CNI
status rather than known fraud status.  As shown in
Equation 17, models are evaluated based on the percentage
of records that had CNIs out of those that it classified as
potentially fraudulent.
[17]      aI Classification Rate
a c
= +CN 
This method may seem appropriate, but it neglects all
the records the model classified as nonfraud.  Table 7
shows the results of a deceptive model from SAC.  Using the
CNI Classification Rate, the model looks good because it
classifies 14 records as fraud and 12 of those had CNIs. 
This results in an excellent score of 85.7%.  However,
there were an additional 83 records with 41 CNIs missed by
the model.  The score is therefore missing a very important





  Fraud Not Fraud
CNI 12 41
Actual
Not CNI 2 42
Table 7.   Example of One Model’s Performance at SAC
Beyond the simple methods described above, there are
more complex methods that use techniques such as logistic
distributions, chi-squared tests, and response curves [Ref.
21].  However, a simple function is valuable here because
it is important that modelers understand the score
development and its interpretation.  By using a simple
scoring function, it will be easier for data miners to
improve scores while developing models.
3. The “Best” Scoring Function.
Where does this discussion leave the current scoring
function?  It is relatively simple and the modelers
understand its application, which is an advantage over more
complex methods.  The function accounts for all the
contingency table data, which is an advantage over the
post-audit score using CNI Classification Rate.  The score
includes weights to stress one type of misclassification
over another, which is a step above simple error rate. 
Additionally, it avoids the fraud being overwhelmed by more
numerous nonfraud payments, which would happen using a
simple error rate. 
The current function does have drawbacks, however. 
First, its spreadsheet implementation is time-consuming,
requiring about ten man-hours to manually enter data, which
equates to approximately $500 per site audit.  To score a
model, its Clementine data matrices must be manually
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transferred from Clementine to the Excel spreadsheet. 
Typically the data is not properly ordered in Clementine so
it must be rearranged before transfer.  The manual data
entry is ripe for mistakes that cause score errors.  This
could result in deleting a potentially excellent model or
keeping a poor performer.  Additionally, there may be
several weeks’ delay from model development to data
transfer, thereby preventing modelers from receiving
immediate feedback during model development.
The spreadsheet implementation is specifically
designed for scoring models during the development phase. 
Because of this specialization, it is not used to rate and
compare model performance on CNIs following audits.  Such a
comparison is desirable and would allow the data-mining
team to find models that perform well before and after an
audit.
On a mathematical level, the false alarm and
sensitivity weights appear misplaced given the modeling
team’s desires and the ensemble approach of record
selection.  Presumably, the models should be finding as
much fraud as possible while letting the ensemble process
remove the nonfraud misclassifications.  However, this is
not occurring because the parameter weight for nonfraud is
five times larger than the one for fraud.  Most likely,
models that found most of the fraud have been discarded
just to reduce false alarm rates and thereby increase
scores.  For a single model, this is a reasonable approach
because the auditors want to minimize time spent auditing
false alarms.  However, the ensemble approach to record
selection screens out many records misclassified by
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individual models.  Therefore, it is important that
individual models find the fraud so that the ensemble has
an overwhelming majority vote for the fraud records.
Another issue is the artificial creation of nonfraud
“cases.”  The site records are grouped by payee to assign
the nonfraud case classification.  The majority of nonfraud
cases consist of one payment; typically 90% of the cases
are composed of no more than two payments.  Misclassifying
some of these nonfraud cases causes only minor changes to
the final score.  On the other hand, the fraud data
typically has only four cases in the test or validation
set.  If one fraud case is misclassified then the case
sensitivity decreases by 25%, which results in a drop of 15
points on the overall score.
4. Implementing the Scoring Function.
The preceding discussion should make it readily
apparent to the reader that there is room for improvement
with the current scoring function.  While it may not need
to be replaced, implementation changes and weight
adjustments are in order.  The next section outlines a
proposed scoring function that encompasses all phases of a
model’s use.  Splitting the current scoring function into
two separate functions will allow evaluating the fraud
cases in the pre-audit scoring, while permitting the
function to be used as a post-audit scoring tool.  These
two scores capture most of the same information thereby
allowing a comparison, albeit indirect, from pre-audit to
post-audit.
Outlined first is the proposed model development
function.  It still contains both the test and validation
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runs, but with several differences.  First, the false alarm
rate based on the nonfraud case data is gone, which
eliminates the artificiality of creating nonfraud cases. 
Instead, the test and validation runs now have a penalty
that deducts points when fraud cases are missed.  Another
change to the case scoring is elimination of squaring the
case sensitivity.  If it were squared, missing the first
case would penalize the model a whopping 44% of the total
penalty.  Therefore, the sensitivity is not squared;
missing the first case is just as important as missing the
last one.
The parameter weights now sum to one, thereby scaling
the score from 0 to 100.  This new scale seems more
intuitive than the current 0-600.  The weight
recommendations are subjectively based on the desires of
the data-mining team.  The goal is to weigh fraud payments
twice as heavily as nonfraud while including a minor
penalty for missing fraud cases.  The proposed scoring
function is:
[18]    ( (1 ) (1Power Powerj s pj f pj c cj
j
Score Gain w w S w F w S= + − −∑ ))−
[19]    1f s cw w w+ + =
[20]       {j = t for test, v for validation}1t vw w+ =
Recommended Weight Assignments
wf=0.3 ws=0.6 wc=0.1 wt=0.5 wv=0.5 Power=2 Gain=100
Next is a post-audit scoring function that can be
compared to the model development score.  It is essentially
the same scoring function, but with the case information
removed.  By using the same base function, it is possible
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to compare model effectiveness from the development phase
through the audit’s completion.
[21]      ( (1 ) )Power Powers fPost Audit Score Gain w S w F= + − 
[22]    1f sw w+ =
Recommended Weight Assignments
wf=1/3 ws=2/3 Power=2 Gain=100
The modified functions address the mathematical
issues: the spreadsheet implementation problems are
resolved by implementing the scoring function as a
Clementine stream.  Now that the function details are
understood, building a stream for the modeler’s palette is
trivial.  The scoring stream can then immediately score
models as they are created.  The details of the Clementine
scoring stream are shown in Appendix B.  As for the post-
audit scores, individual model scores can be calculated in
the DFAS Access audit database and immediately evaluated
following an audit.
One benefit of a Clementine scoring stream is that the
score output can be easily copied over to a single Excel
worksheet.  Each modeler can post his or her own model
scores immediately and the head data-miner can track scores
as the model development phase progresses.  After audits,
the post-audit model scores can be copied from Access into
the same Excel worksheet for direct comparison within and
between models.  These changes to the scoring process will
save time and simplify model evaluation.
B. CNI KNOWLEDGE BASE DEVELOPMENT.
1. CNI Data.
At each site, auditors complete a checklist in an
Access database for each audited record.  The checklist
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includes preloaded categories for the auditors to describe
any regulatory violations.  The auditor can assign more
than one type of CNI to a record simply by selecting all
applicable categories.  In the background the categories
have two associated fields: CNI and comment codes.  Each
comment code is unique to the specific comment, but there
are only four categories for CNI codes as shown in Table 8.
The records can be queried from the database either by
individual transaction or by comment code.  A query that
extracts data by the comment codes may return a transaction
more than once if it has more than one assigned comment
code.  A query that extracts the data by payment will
return each transaction exactly once with the worst case
CNI Code that it received.  This means that even if a
record has more than one comment, it will be listed only
once in the table.  This difference is significant and must
be understood when building a CNI knowledge base.
CNI Type Code
Significant Condition Needing Improvement (SCNI) 1
Condition Needing Improvement (CNI) 2
Observation (Obs) 3
No CNI (NCNI) 4
Table 8.   CNI Code Breakdown
2. Reasons for Data Inclusion/Exclusion.
a. Sites Selected.
Table 9 lists the audits in which IR Seaside has
been involved.  It would be desirable to include all this
data in a knowledge base; however, the data-mining process
was still in flux at the earlier sites.  Initially, the
data-miners were actively training the auditors on the
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Access database.  Furthermore, CNI and comment codes were
not standardized.  Including the data from all the sites
would require substantial data cleaning.  Even if it were
possible to adequately cleanse the data, there is no
guarantee that the interpretation of the data was
consistent at the early sites.  Therefore, it is necessary
to carefully select sites for inclusion while excluding
sites that are more problematic.
DFAS Site Date Keep in database?
San Diego Feb 2000 No CNI data
San Bernardino Feb 2000 No CNI data
Denver Feb 2000 No CNI data
Oakland Apr 2000 No
Omaha Jul 2000 No
Pensacola Aug 2000 No
Dayton  Dec 2000 No
Oakland (OA) Jan 2001 Yes
San Diego (SD) Apr 2001 Yes
San Antonio IAPS (SAI) Jul 2001 Yes
San Antonio CAPS (SAC) Jul 2001 Yes
Dayton Feb 2002 (Data Unavailable)
Table 9.   Site Audits Since Data-mining Inception
The last three sites of 2001 were a good baseline
with which to start developing a knowledge base.  Issues
that had been resolved by the time of the SD audit were
field standardization, common model annotation, common
field derivation and meaningful model naming.  SAI and SAC
were identical in all these aspects, but SD had some minor
differences that were easy to fix.  However, in a desire to
maintain potentially useful data, OA was deemed acceptable. 
While it was at the cusp of the standardization efforts,
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its data is not drastically different.  Many OA field
headings were different but contained the same information
as the other sites.  Additionally, some fields that were
used at OA had subsequently been phased out.  By overcoming
these surmountable obstacles the OA data was included,
thereby increasing the number of records by over 30%.
b. Audit Methods and Records Retained.
The question of which records should be included
in the database is important because not all CNIs are
created equally.  The key is to include records that have
received a thorough screening and an appropriate CNI
classification.  How a record is selected determines how
thoroughly it is audited.  The auditors consistently
evaluate three record types at each site:  those chosen
with a supervised technique, those chosen at random and
those chosen with an unsupervised technique.  Auditors
carefully scrutinize all information in these transactions
while completing the Access checklist.  Whether or not the
record has a CNI, we are assured of an accurate
classification based upon the auditors’ findings. 
Therefore, these three record types should be included in a
CNI knowledge base.
Records of the remaining two types typically do
not receive the same attention to detail.  The duplicate
payment records are usually submitted to the site only for
review as a duplicate payment.  There is no guarantee that
an auditor will have reviewed it in accordance with the
checklist.  Along the same line of reasoning, related
records may not be audited unless a problem exists with a
record’s supervised parent.  A related record classified as
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non-CNI may or may not have been audited.  However, the
converse is not true: if a related record has a CNI then an
auditor must have reviewed the record.  Therefore, it would
be unwise to include these two types for analysis because
there is no guarantee that non-CNI records have been
audited.
Taking these points into consideration, is it
beneficial to include all the site records in the database? 
All five types of records are readily available.  Rather
than reject data that may prove valuable later, it is
better to include all records from the sites.  However,
when using the data for a particular analysis it is
important that the modelers understand the need to filter
records that do not apply to that analysis.
c. Fields Retained.
Having decided which records to retain, the next
step is to identify applicable fields.  Not all sites had
the same standardized data fields; therefore, site fields
must be compared prior to building a knowledge base. 
Tallying the different field names results in 219 possible
fields.  Many fields in the OA database had the same
information as fields in the SD, SAC and SAI databases, but
with different names.  Identifying the fields with the
assistance of the head data-miner eliminated these
inconsistencies.
OA also contained fields with no corresponding field
at the other sites or which were no longer in use. 
Additionally, some of these fields contained all zeros or
N/As and were therefore useless.  These fields were deleted
altogether.  Appendix C contains a detailed table of which
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fields were available at each site, which fields were kept
and any significant comments related to the field status. 
The end result is the retention of 161 data fields with the
addition of an “AUDIT_SITE” field that identifies the site
from which a record came.
3. CNI Knowledge Database Development.
Having evaluated the records and fields from the four
sites, the final step is to generate a single data table of
audit records.  When creating this table it must be
flexible enough to allow introducing new site data
following future audits.  To facilitate expansion, the
fields were structured around the San Antonio data because
it has the format expected of future site audits.
The following methodology was employed to create the
new knowledge base.  First, for each site a query was
created that extracted records on a per-payment basis. 
Each record has one entry with all the fields including a
CNI field composed of the worst CNI Code associated with
the record.  For instance, if one record has two comments
that correspond to CNI codes of 1 (SCNI) and 2 (CNI), the
new record entry includes all the payment data only once
with an overall CNI code of 1.
To build the CNI knowledge base, an empty table was
generated in Access that was formatted to meet all the
current field specifications.  Then, append queries were
conducted to include each site’s data in the table.  With
all four sites appended, the knowledge base is complete and
ready for employment.  Additionally, it will be a simple
matter to update the current knowledge base following
future audits.  The head data-miner can simply generate the
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same query for the new sites using the query already built
into the IR Seaside audit database.
What benefits are there to having a CNI knowledge
base?  First, it can be employed to evaluate current
models’ abilities to predict CNIs at recent sites and
thereby determine model effectiveness.  Furthermore, the
data-miners can use the CNI knowledge base to build new
models for audit record selection.  This is where the
expansion of the knowledge base will come into play because
it will continue to grow with each new site audit.
C. IMPROVING RECORD SELECTION.
1. Model Ensemble Discussion.
Record selection is currently achieved using a voting
ensemble in which models are equally weighted.  The
individual models classify records as fraud (1) or nonfraud
(0) and then the model votes are summed for each record. 
The result is an integer value between zero and the number
of models (11 in SAC/SAI, 23 in SD/OA).  Any records
receiving a majority vote are classified as potentially
fraudulent.  For instance, at SD 1755 records received a
simple majority of votes.  However, resources (auditors,
time, and money) are limited during an audit so not all
1755 records can be screened.
Before each audit, the data-mining team establishes a
target for the number of supervised records that can be
reviewed given the available resources.  To reach this
goal, the team sets a vote tally that becomes the cutoff
for record review.  For example, at Dayton in 2002 it
planned to review 140 supervised records.  After the model
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votes were tallied, the appropriate cutoff to reach that
goal was determined to be eight votes.
Although the number of records selected is kept to a
manageable number, the elevated cutoff does come with a
cost.  For instance, Dayton records were selected if 8 of
11 models classified the record as fraud.  With the cutoff
at nearly 75% of models, the potential exists for voting
blocs to take over the selection process.  If 4 of 11
models vote together by consistently classifying records as
nonfraud, they may dominate the voting and reduce the
benefit of the voting scheme.  The question then becomes
how best to have the ensemble vote, while still controlling
the number of records that are labeled as potentially
fraudulent.
2. The Best Individual Classifiers.
With the introduction of a CNI knowledge base, there
are now additional means of assessing model performance. 
Consider an ensemble built from the best individual
classifiers of CNIs.  This is similar to the way in which
models have been evaluated following each site audit. 
However, with the CNI database, it is possible to assay
model performance on more diverse data and then compare
models to one another.  To demonstrate this technique, we
initially conducted a comparison of models using simple
correct classification rates of those records that were
selected by the supervised method.  The results of this
comparison are shown in Appendix D.
Knowing the capability of individual models may be
interesting, but the best ensemble may not use all the
models with the best classification rates.  The ensemble’s
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purpose is to provide an output that enhances the models’
CNI detection capability while compensating for their
inability to screen non-CNIs.  If an ensemble used only the
best individual classifiers, it might be no better than the
best individual model.  The goal is to combine independent
models to create a classification tool that is better than
the sum of its parts [Ref. 1].  Therefore, although it may
be useful to compare models individually, it is more
important to create an ensemble such that overall
classification improves.
3. Optimizing Ensemble CNI Detection.
How well can the simple majority-vote ensemble work? 
To answer this question, we propose a simple integer linear
program to optimize the ensemble CNI classification rate. 
The linear program will choose an optimal subset of the 52
unique models employed at the four sites.  To solve the
linear program a software package called the General
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) Interactive Development
Environment is used [Ref. 24].  The detailed GAMS
formulation is shown in Appendix E with a description and
results provided here.
To implement the GAMS program, the supervised model
records discussed in Section V.B were used as the voting
data.  This data consists of 563 records of which 308 were
classified as CNIs.  Each record had an actual CNI value
that was 0 for non-CNIs and 1 for any other CNI code (cnir). 
Each model voted on each record with a 1 representing a
fraud classification and a 0 representing nonfraud
(voter,m).  Proper classification occurs when the vote
majority agrees with the CNI rating.  The program changes
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ensemble size from 3 to 21 models by increments of two
(enssize).  This permits determination of the best ensemble
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The number of possible model combinations in the case
of eleven models is 52-choose-11 or 6.0x1010.  In
evaluating the ensembles, classification rate is used due
to its simplicity and ease of interpretation.  Reported
along with the correct classification rate is a contingency
table similar to Table 5.  The best ensemble classification
performance attained was 398 out of 563 records.  This
results in a 70.7% classification rate and occurred with
both 7-model and 11-model ensembles.  The correct
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classification rates decrease as models are added or
removed from this optimum.  Figure 4 shows the ensemble
size versus correct classification rate and the contingency






































Figure 4.   Optimized Classification Rates by Ensemble Size

  Predicted










Table 10.   Optimized Ensemble CNI Classification Results
Figure 5 shows the individual model classification
rates with the ensemble classification rate represented by
the bold line at 70.7%.  This plot clearly shows that the
ensemble is classifying better than any of its individual
models.  Furthermore, the models in the optimal ensemble
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are not the best 11 models from Appendix D.  Rather, the
model blend appears to be balanced to create a better
ensemble.  However, we must caution the reader that this
ensemble is presumably over-fit to this data and that its
accuracy could decline when presented with unseen data.  If
this is the best model ensemble available then perhaps IR




































































E n s e m b l e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  r a t e  a t  7 0 . 7 %

Figure 5.   Best Ensemble Classification Rates
4. The Underlying Classification Issue.
If building and applying a model ensemble is an
optimization problem, then a classification rate of 70.7%
and the contingency table results in Table 10 seem
unimpressive.  Perhaps a majority-voting scheme may be
incapable of identifying subtle patterns in the records or
maybe there just is not enough information in the data. 
However, combining model votes might be viewed as yet
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another layer in record classification if model votes were
treated as additional predictor variables.  Then we can
build a “second-stage model” that combines model votes to
produce a single fraud classification.
The idea investigated here is a second-stage
regression neural network.  Individual model votes are the
inputs and the network has an output that ranges from 0 to
1.  An output of 1 indicates that the record is worthy of
review, while a 0 indicates that the record is clean and
requires no further action.  The regression network’s
output is continuous and should fall somewhere between 0
and 1 due to the inputs being 0 or 1.  By doing it this
way, the team does not need to set a discrete number of
votes as a cutoff for record selection.  Instead, they
would sort the output from highest to lowest and take the
desired number of records from the sorted list.
In order to compare results, the models in the
optimized ensemble from Section V.C.3 were used.  The model
outputs were the predictor variables to train the neural
network.  The response variable is the CNI values condensed
in the same way as for the optimized ensemble.  That is,
any CNI is treated as a problem (1) while the non-CNIs were
good payments (0).  The statistical package used was S-Plus
[Ref. 25] along with a dataset consisting of model votes
and CNI codes for all four sites.  The neural net was built
using the neural network library of Venables and Ripley
[Ref. 26].  The outputs produced by the network resulted in
a correct classification rate of 92%.  This result was
determined by labeling any record with a net output >0.5 as
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a CNI and any that had ≤0.5 as a non-CNI.  Table 11
contains the results.
Comparing this outcome to the optimized ensemble using
a simple majority vote results in an increase in correct
classification rate of nearly 22%.  Since each of the two
techniques used all the data to classify the records, each
method is presumably over-fit.  However, building this
neural net proves that records misclassified by the
majority vote may still be identified via other
classification methods.













Table 11.   Neural Network CNI Classification Results
Opportunities exist to improve the record selection
process.  If using second-stage classifiers to combine
model votes, then the process should be made robust by
splitting the data into train and test sets or using some
type of cross-validation method.  Relevant techniques are
outlined in, for example, Hand’s Construction and
Assessment of Classification Rules [Ref.21].
5. Sequential Selection Method.
Another technique selects just the records that
received votes from all ensemble models.  There were very
few of these records at the four sites analyzed because of
the large number of models in the ensembles.  However, if
we were more selective in choosing models, we might perform
sequential model screening.  All site records would be
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submitted to the first model and all that are predicted to
be fraud would be passed on to the second model.  In the
final Clementine stream, each model would see only the data
that was classified as potential fraud by all preceding
models.  This process would continue until only the records
that were predicted to be fraud by all ensemble models
remained.  Model selection would be based on the model’s
ability to find as many CNIs as possible.  Revisiting Table
5, the goal is to find models with minimal b cell values in
the contingency table.  The consequence of this method is
that most CNIs are retained after each pass while mostly
non-CNIs are removed.
Examination of the SAI data shows that the number of
records can be reduced from 132,699 records to 216 records
by using just the three most CNI-sensitive models.  The
three models selected had sensitivities of 100%, 100% and
87.5% on the SAI supervised records.  The site data
contains the 56 audited records comprised of 14 CNIs and 42
non-CNIs.  In reducing the records for review, as shown in
Table 12, only 2 of the 14 CNIs are missed for an ensemble
sensitivity of 87.5%.  On the other hand, the non-CNIs are
sequentially screened such that 29 of the 42 non-CNIs are
rejected for an ensemble false alarm rate of 31.0%. 
Combining these results gives an overall correct
classification rate of 73.2% for the audited records.  Of
the 216 selected records, the remaining 160 unaudited
records have an unknown status, but this three-model
ensemble points to the need for further review.  This 73.2%
classification rate shows that sequential selection is one




  Fraud Not Fraud
CNI 12 2
Actual
Not CNI 13 29
Table 12.   Sequential Screening Ensemble Results on SAI Data
D. SUGGESTED CNI MODELING PROCESS.
With the completion of the CNI knowledge base, the
capability now exists for modeling on CNIs.  IR Seaside has
developed standard operating procedures for modeling on the
fraud knowledge base, but some of the assumptions made and
methods used may not apply when modeling with the CNI data. 
This section will address some of the more obvious issues.  
1. Differences between Fraud and CNI Data.
As previously stated in Chapter 2, the fraud model
development process assumes that sampled site data is not
fraud.  However, the assumption that site data has no CNIs
would not be justified.  From Figure 2 it is readily
apparent that randomly selected records have greater than
20% CNI rates (CNI Codes 1-3) for all four sites. 
Obviously, it must be assumed that the site data has a
significant proportion of CNIs.  Instead of combining site
data with knowledge base data, it would be more appropriate
to develop models solely using the CNI knowledge base. 
Following model development, an ensemble would be used to
select records for review from the entire site population.
Another difference between databases is the detailed
statistical analysis already conducted on the fraud.  The
records have been evaluated and clustered into different
fraud types that are used when building and scoring models. 
Conversely, the CNI knowledge base has not been subjected
  63
to such scrutiny.  However, these records naturally fall
into the four CNI categories shown in Table 8.  For the
time being this might be useful, but a more detailed
analysis of the CNI data may be in order to gain insights
into relationships between CNI types and the different
records and fields.
2. Train/Test Methodology.
Currently, three subsets of data are used in model
development: training, test and validate datasets.  Models
are built using the training data, and then initially
evaluated using the test data.  At this point, model
development is an iterative process; if the model performs
poorly on the test data, the modeler will retrain the model
on the training data.  This process repeats until the
modeler is satisfied.  Consequently, the model error rates
on the test data are over-optimistic because this data was
used, albeit indirectly, to train the model.  At the
conclusion of this process, the model classifies the
validation data to determine model effectiveness and then
the validation and test results are used to score the
model.
When developing CNI models this method can be applied
by dividing data into training and test subsets.  Instead
of generating three sets on eleven unique splits, the CNI
data could be randomly separated prior to each model
development.  By randomly generating these subsets, there
is less chance of models being highly correlated. 
Clementine can automatically generate the training and test
sets and store them in separate files when the data is
imported.  The modeler would then use a model training
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stream to build the model.  Following model development,
the model would be placed into the test stream for
evaluation and immediate calculation of an objective score. 
Figure 6 shows an example of a model development palette
using the CNI knowledge base. 
 

Figure 6.   Clementine Screenshot of Test/Train Palette
A train, test and validate breakdown could help
minimize problems transitioning to CNI modeling.  However,
depending on the subset of the CNI knowledge base used, the
three development sets may each have to be small.  For
example, the current CNI knowledge base only has 563
supervised records.  Equally distributing this data into
training, test and validation subsets would result in only
189 records in each subset.  This fairly small number seems
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inadequate to begin building and evaluating models. 
However, as the database grows the potential for three
distinct development data groups will also grow.  For
instance, by adding just three more audit sites to the CNI
knowledge base, the supervised population should exceed
1000 records, thereby providing suitable subset sizes.

3. Scoring Process and Ensemble Building.
Evaluating the CNI models doesn’t pose a significant
difference from the scoring proposed in Section V.A. If
using only test and training datasets, the model’s test
results could be used as in the proposed post-audit score
in Equation 21.  If using a train, test and validate
approach, the models could be evaluated using a weighted
score of the test and validate results much like the
proposed model development score in Equation 18, only
without the case penalty.  In either instance, the
functions already proposed for scoring would prove capable.
Ensembles may be built as they are now or by using one
of the alternatives discussed in Section V.C.  The use of
an ensemble is a perfect fit for this modeling process
because each model is built and evaluated on different
subsets of the knowledge base.  Using an ensemble would
therefore capture the strengths of each model while
reducing bias, variability, or both. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS.
1. Fraud and CNIs Are Related.
The auditing literature contains ample evidence
demonstrating that a significant proportion of detected
fraud has documentation discrepancies.  This link between
CNIs and fraud provides a launching point for IR Seaside to
evaluate the success of their fraud detection models. 
Nevertheless, CNIs should not be the only tool used to
evaluate model success, because the ultimate goal is to
root out fraud.  When data-mining efforts lead to the
successful prosecution of fraud, then IR Seaside will have
a direct means of measuring the success of their fraud
detection efforts.  In the meantime, CNI results are an
appropriate measurement tool.  Besides, even if the data
mining does not lead directly to finding fraud, the
project’s deterrent aspect and the reduction in CNIs are
valuable aids in preventing fraud.
2. Supervised Is Better Than Random Selection.
Selective record screening is proving to be a valuable
aid to the DFAS IR audit teams, because the supervised
modeling process is finding CNIs.  This project
successfully incorporates sophisticated technology to
search the vast stores of DFAS site data.  Rather than
using outmoded, traditional random selection of a handful
of records from among many thousands, supervised modeling
targets those records that seem to require a detailed look. 
DFAS IR should exploit this record selection process all
the time, not just at sites targeted by IR Seaside.  If IR
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Seaside creates predeveloped ensemble streams, the team
should be able to generate audit lists in less than a week,
rather than the many weeks the current process takes.
3. The Current Modeling Process Has Reached its
Limit.
Evaluating model scores using the current performance
measure shows that model development is not improving.  A
look at Figure 3 shows that model scores for year 2001
sites are not increasing with time.  If the model scores
are static then much effort could be saved by implementing
novel strategies using the current library of models. 
Extensive effort and cost has gone into the production of
this model library.  There is an adequate set of models
available to build canned ensemble streams which could then
be rapidly deployed to support all DFAS IR audits.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS.
1. An Improved Scoring Function.
The current scoring function is inadequate and its
present spreadsheet implementation is cumbersome and error-
prone.  The proposed alternative model development function
will save time by using Clementine to rapidly calculate a
score, thereby saving many hours of data transfer. 
Calculating the score in Clementine also gives immediate
access to an objective score during development, which will
enable modelers to improve the model while it is under
construction.  Additionally, by applying the same baseline
function throughout the life of a model, the scores can be
directly compared within and between models.  This enhances
the usefulness of the scores, thereby allowing feedback
from the audits to improve the modeling process.
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2. The CNI Knowledge Base.
Hoping to take advantage of audit results, the data-
mining team felt that a CNI knowledge base would be
valuable in several ways.  First, the CNI data can be used
to evaluate ensemble construction using the current models. 
This was demonstrated in Section V.C where an optimized
ensemble was found and where alternatives to majority-vote
ensembles were discussed.  The CNI database adds
flexibility when developing and assessing these model
ensembles.
In addition to evaluating current models, the CNI
knowledge base can be a separate launching pad for building
models to find CNIs directly.  One distinct advantage of a
CNI knowledge base is that the database will continuously
grow as each new site’s audit results are added to the
database.  A detailed analysis of the CNI knowledge base is
beyond the scope of this thesis, but would provide adequate
material for additional research as another thesis topic.  
One of the main reasons for developing a CNI knowledge
base is the paucity of readily available, documented cases
of fraud within DFAS.  There are likely a sizeable number
of cases available at investigative agencies, which for
various reasons have not made it into IR Seaside’s
database.  Even though CNIs provide additional knowledge,
if the main goal is to find fraud, then the best source of
knowledge should still be a comprehensive fraud data
warehouse.  The current fraud data has essentially remained
unchanged for three years.  This issue has been touched
upon in Section III.C, but is another area for research
that could provide an excellent thesis opportunity.
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3. Constructing Ensembles from Current Library.
IR Seaside has assembled a large library of models
over the last few years.  We believe there are enough
models to begin combining them without having to repeat the
model building process for each audit.  Not only can
ensembles be built using the current library, but also
record selection can be improved by using alternatives to
the majority-voting scheme.  As shown in Section V.C, the
best majority-vote ensemble CNI classification rate for the
four sites was 70.7%.  The ensemble performance may be
improved by treating the model votes as a classification
problem.  Using the same data and models, a neural net was
able to achieve an increase in correct classification rate
of 22% over the majority-vote scheme.  This increased
performance demonstrates that the concept is valid and
alternatives to majority voting should be explored and
implemented.
4. Model Development Using CNI Knowledge Base.
Differences exist between the fraud and CNI knowledge
bases such as population prevalences, the use of site data
for training models, and data set sizes.  However, the
majority of the concepts such as model building/testing,
model evaluation and ensemble building will remain the
same.  The data-mining team should be able to assimilate
the CNI knowledge base into the data-mining process rather
quickly.  If further analysis is conducted on the CNI
knowledge base, new insights may come forth that show
previously undiscovered relationships within the data. 
This is an area ripe for further research, whether as a
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thesis or as data mining by the IR Seaside team.  Whatever
the means, the team now has another tool available when
searching for fraud within DFAS payments.
C. CLOSING REMARKS.
IR Seaside is using modern technology to improve the
audit process.  It must continue to explore new
technologies and methodologies in its effort to save the
taxpayers’ money from fraudulent activity and
misappropriation.  The ideas presented in this thesis
developed from daily interactions with modelers, auditors
and supervisors.  This thesis is hopefully the first step
in a lasting relationship between the Naval Postgraduate
School and DFAS IR Seaside, because there are many
interesting concepts that have been touched upon here.  The
opportunity for thesis students to bring in fresh ideas and
capabilities will only add to the value of the data-mining
efforts, while providing exciting research opportunities to
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APPENDIX A. S-PLUS CODE FOR CHAPTER IV ANALYSIS
This appendix displays the S-Plus code used for the analyses
performed in Chapter 4.  It is provided for the reader to see the
details of each analysis.  The S-Plus commands are highlighted in
boldface.

1 – Supervised versus random selection (Section IV.B).

This section shows the S-Plus analysis of the Mantel-Haenzel test
to test the hypothesis that supervised modeling is more effective
at identifying CNIs than random selection.  The hypothesis is
shown on page 29.

We initially need to build the array of results from the four










     [,1] [,2] 
[1,]  169   52
[2,]   63   40

, , 2
     [,1] [,2] 
[1,]   69  118
[2,]    7   23

, , 3
     [,1] [,2] 
[1,]   16   42
[2,]   13   37

, , 4
     [,1] [,2] 
[1,]   53   44
[2,]   16   34

The next step is to build the row (ri), column (ci), site record
number (Ni) and positively identified CNI (xi) variables for

















[1] 324 217 108 147















The final step is to determine the p-value by comparing Z.stat to





The result is a resounding rejection of the null hypothesis with
the p-value = 0.000067.

2 - Model improvement test (Section IV.C).

This section tests the hypothesis that the model scores are not
increasing from site to site over time.  The hypothesis is shown
on page 33.













   Mod.names Mod.scores 
 1        SD     552.93
 2        SD     552.93
 3        SD     533.00
 4        SD     529.98
 5        SD     528.85
 6       SAI     536.53
 7       SAI     535.38
 8       SAI     545.05
 9       SAI     565.98
10       SAI     534.22
11       SAC     539.84
12       SAC     530.09
13       SAC     550.19
14       SAC     558.47
15       SAC     568.78
16        OA     553.07
17        OA     530.63
18        OA     589.67
19        OA     558.46
20        OA     584.96
21        OA     547.19
22        OA     545.70





   aov(formula = Mod.scores ~ Mod.names, data = Mod.imp)

Terms:
                Mod.names Residuals 
 Sum of Squares  1237.267  5007.780
Deg. of Freedom         3        18

Residual standard error: 16.67963 
Estimated effects may be unbalanced

> summary(Mod.imp.aov)
          Df Sum of Sq  Mean Sq  F Value     Pr(F) 
Mod.names  3  1237.267 412.4223 1.482414 0.2529318




ANOVA model plots (not shown) show that ANOVA assumptions are not
met.  The next step is to build the rank matrix to evaluate the
data with a Kruskal-Wallis test.

> table(rank(Mod.scores), Mod.names)
     OA SAC SAI SD 
   1  0   0   0  1
   2  0   0   0  1
   3  0   1   0  0
   4  1   0   0  0
   5  0   0   0  1
   6  0   0   1  0
   7  0   0   1  0
   8  0   0   1  0
   9  0   1   0  0
  10  0   0   1  0
  11  1   0   0  0
  12  1   0   0  0
  13  0   1   0  0
14.5  0   0   0  2
  16  1   0   0  0
  17  1   0   0  0
  18  0   1   0  0
  19  0   0   1  0
  20  0   1   0  0
  21  1   0   0  0
  22  1   0   0  0


Perform a Kruskal-Wallis test in S-Plus.
> kruskal.test(Mod.scores, Mod.names)

 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test

data:  Mod.scores and Mod.names 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 4.12, df = 3, p-value = 0.25 
alternative hypothesis: two.sided 

To verify the Kruskal-Wallis test, calculate the T statistic
shown in Chapter IV.

> rank(Mod.scores[Mod.names=="SD"])
[1] 4.5 4.5 3.0 2.0 1.0

> rank(Mod.scores)[Mod.names=="SD"]
[1] 14.5 14.5  5.0  2.0  1.0

> rank(Mod.scores)[Mod.names=="SAI"]





[1]  9  3 13 18 20

> rank(Mod.scores)[Mod.names=="OA"]













The final step is to check the test statistic against a chi-




The result is a p-value of 0.25, which shows that the data does
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APPENDIX B. CLEMENTINE IMPLEMENTATION OF MODEL
DEVELOPMENT SCORE FUNCTION
This appendix shows the implementation of the scoring
function within Clementine.  Screenshots that show nodes
within the scoring function will be presented and
explained.  This provides DFAS IR with the information
necessary to make informed changes to the scoring stream if
they deem it necessary in the future.
Figure 7 is the entire scoring function stream.  The
stream starts with a filter node that removes all fields
except for “FRAUD_TYPE”, “CASE_NAME” and “$N-FRAUD_TYPE”. 
Each node will be described and screenshots of specific
nodes will help explain the internal code.  The data used
for this screenshot is for illustrative purposes and comes
from the actual voting data from a recent training dataset.


Figure 7.   Clementine Score Development Screenshot
The first type node ensures the three fields are all
typed as sets for proper calculations.  The derive node,
“Vote” changes the “$N-FRAUD_TYPE” to a 0/1 flag. 
Depending on the model type used, this node will rename the
predicted fraud type into the “Vote” flag to enable the
downstream nodes to properly work.  For DFAS purposes,
separate scoring streams will be needed for use with each
type of model that will be used (i.e. C5.0 or NN).  After
the “Vote” node, the data is split into two sub streams for
determination of the payment and case variables.  
The “Payment Info” Supernode is shown in Figure 8. 
This node contains the stream that breaks down the payment
information into the contingency table data of Table 5. 
The “ActFraud” node creates a 0/1 flag that identifies a
record as actual fraud or nonfraud.  The next four derive
nodes tally the number of records that would fall within
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each cell in Table 5.  The sort node then sorts the records
from highest “a” value to lowest, which means the first
record has the sum for each of the four cell values “a”,
“b”, “c”, and “d”.  The filter node removes all unnecessary
fields, and the “Extract Data” node keeps only the first
record, which contains the Table 5 cell values.  The last




Figure 8.   “Payment Info” Supernode
The other branch following the “Vote” node in Figure 7
goes to the case sub stream.  The first node is a select
node that keeps only the fraud data and strips off all non-
fraud data.  From this node, two sub streams are formed,
one to determine the total number of cases and the other to
determine the number of cases identified as fraud.
Figure 9 shows the “Number of Cases” Supernode.  The
first node in this branch is an aggregate node that counts
each “CASE_NAME” in the dataset.  This is followed by a
derive node, “NumCases,” which tallies the number of cases. 
The sort node then sorts by number of cases from highest
number to lowest.  This sort places the case total in the
first record location, to subsequently be stripped off by
the “1” sample node.  The final filter node removes all
fields except for “NumCases.”


Figure 9.   “NumCases” Supernode
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The other Supernode in the case sub stream is shown in
Figure 10.  This Supernode is similar to “NumCases” except
that a select node at the beginning of the stream keeps
only the records that received a “Vote” of 1.  The
remainder of the stream works the same way as “NumCases.” 
The result is that if any payments within a case were
classified as potential fraud, then that case is




Figure 10.   “NumCasesFound” Supernode
Following the three Supernodes, all the fields are
merged together for the score determination.  The fields
that now remain are “a”, “b”, “c”, “d”, “NumCases” and
“NumCasesFound.”  This data is fed into the “Score
Determination” Supernode shown in Figure 11.


Figure 11.   “Score Determination” Supernode
The first three nodes in Figure 11 calculate the
payment False Alarm (FAp), payment Sensitivity (Sp), and
the case Sensitivity (Sc).  The first two calculations come
straight from Equations 6 and 7 on page 38.  The case
sensitivity is found by dividing the “NumCasesFound” by
“NumCases.”  The filter node then removes unneeded fields. 
The next four nodes are used to assign the weights used in
the score function.  If DFAS desires to change weights in
the future then it will be a simple matter to just reassign
the weights within the derive nodes.  The final derive node
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is the actual score calculation for the data run as shown
in Equation 18 on page 47.  Figure 12 shows the
implementation of the equation in the derive node.  


Figure 12.   “Score” Node Screenshot
The final node in the “Score Determination” Supernode
is a table to display the results of the score
determination.  The four cell values of Table 5 are
displayed, as are the pertinent sensitivity rates and false
alarm rates.  Additionally the weights and score are
displayed.  The resulting output is shown in Figure 13.  It
is then a simple matter to highlight the information in








APPENDIX C. CNI KNOWLEDGE BASE FIELDS
This appendix consists of a table of variable fields
available across the four sites of OA, SD, SAC and SAI. 
The locations of each field are shown next to the name with
a (1) meaning that field was represented at the site. 
Additionally, whether or not that field was retained in the
CNI knowledge base is also represented by a (0) or (1) in
the status column.  Finally, any comments regarding each


















ADDRESS13 1 1 1 1 1  
AGGREG_ADR 1 1 1 1 1  
AGGREG_PAYEE 1 1 1 1 1  
ALL_OTHER 1 1 1 1 1  
ALLX 1 1 1 1 1  
AVG_5K 1 1 1 1 1  
AUDIT_SITE 0 0 0 0 1 Generated to track which site a record came from. 
AWARD_DT 1 1 1 1 1  
BNR_AMT 1 0 0 0 0 Populated with N/As and only at OA. 
BCO_ID 0 1 1 1 1 Only populated at SAI. Updated OA.  
BRAC 1 1 1 1 1  
C_INV_NUM 1 1 1 1 1  
CAGE_CD 0 1 1 1 1 Update OA, but OA all blank. 
CASE 1 0 0 1 0 Changed to CASE_NAME starting at SA, changed SD & OA field 
name to match. 
CASE_NAME 0 1 1 0 1 Updated OA and SD to match. 
CDF_REMIT_TO 1 0 0 0 0 Renamed to CDF_RMT_NAME to match later sites. 
CDF_RMT_CITY 1 1 1 1 1  
CDF_RMT_L1 1 1 1 1 1  
CDF_RMT_L2 1 1 1 1 1  
CDF_RMT_L3 1 1 1 1 1  
CDF_RMT_L4 1 1 1 1 1  
CDF_RMT_NAME 0 1 1 1 1 OA field CDF_REMIT_TO changed to match. 
CDF_RMT_ST 1 1 1 1 1  
CDF_RMT_ZIP 1 1 1 1 1  


















CHK_AWARD_DT 1 1 1 1 1  
CHK_CAN_DT 0 1 1 1 1 OA field DTCKCAN changed to match 
CHK_DT 1 1 1 1 1  
CHK_INV_DT 1 1 1 1 1  
CHK_INV_RECV_DT 1 1 1 1 1  
CHK_NUM 1 1 1 1 1  
CHK_STAT 1 1 1 1 1  
CHK_XREF 1 1 1 1 1  
CNI_Code 1 1 1 1 1  
CNT_CDF 1 1 1 1 1  
CON_AMT 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA.   
CON_STAT 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
CON_TYP 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
Control_Number 1 1 1 1 1  
DBOF 1 1 1 1 1  
DEL_ORD 1 1 1 1 1  
DFAR 1 0 0 0 0 Changed 1 to 0 and 0 to 1, then renamed NOT_DFAR. 
DISC_AMT 1 1 1 1 1  
DISCOUNT 1 1 1 1 1  
DOV_AMT 1 1 1 1 1  
DOVAMT_1K 1 1 1 1 1  
DOVAMT_2K 1 1 1 1 1  
DSSN 1 1 1 1 1  
DTCKCAN 1 0 0 0 0 Changed name to CHK_CAN_DT to match other sites. 
DUNS 1 0 0 0 0 Changed name to DUNS_NUM to match other sites. 
DUNS_NUM 0 1 1 1 1 OA field DUNS changed to match. 
DUPAY109 0 1 1 0 1 
DUPAY111 0 1 1 0 1 
Generated new fields in OA and SD and populated with 
zeros. 
DUPPAY102 1 1 1 1 1  
DUPPAY110 1 1 1 1 1  
EFT_ACCT 1 1 1 1 1  
EFT_ADR 1 1 1 1 1  
EFT_PAYEE 1 1 1 1 1  
EFT_RTN 1 1 1 1 1  
EFT_TRAN 1 0 0 0 0 Populated with N/As and only at OA, deleted. 
EFT_TRANS 1 0 0 0 0 Populated with all zeros and only at OA, deleted. 
ENHANCE_PAYEE 1 1 1 1 1  
FCUR_TYP 1 0 0 0 0 Populated with all zeros and only at OA, deleted. 
FEW_PYMT 1 1 1 1 1  

















FOB 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
FRAUD_TYP 1 0 0 0 0 
FRAUD_TYPE 1 1 1 1 0 
All these records are Nonfraud records, fields of no value, 
deleted. 
FRT_AMT 1 1 1 1 1  
FRT_STAT 1 1 1 1 1  
INDEBT 1 0 0 0 0 Populated with all N/As and only at OA, deleted. 
GS_IND 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
INT_PD_AMT 0 1 1 1 1 OA field IP_AMT changed to match. 
INTEREST 1 1 1 1 1  
INV_AMT 1 1 1 1 1  
INV_AWARD_DT 1 1 1 1 1  
INV_CNT 1 1 1 1 1  
INV_DT 1 1 1 1 1  
INV_ENTR_DT 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
INV_NUM 1 1 1 1 1  
INV_PAYEE 1 1 1 1 1  
INV_RCVD 1 1 1 1 1  
INV_RECV_AWARD_DT 1 1 1 1 1  
INV_RECV_INV_DT 1 1 1 1 1  
INV_SEQ 1 1 1 1 1  
INV_SUPP 1 0 0 0 0 Populated with blanks and only at OA, deleted. 
IP_AMT 1 0 0 0 0 Changed name to INT_PD_AMT to match other sites. 
JON 1 0 0 0 0 Populated with blanks and only at OA, deleted. 
LINEITEM 1 1 1 1 1  
LOCKBOX 1 1 1 1 1  
LOST_AMT 1 1 1 1 1  
LOST_CD 1 1 1 1 1  
M_PYMT 1 1 1 1 1  
MAN_IND 1 1 1 1 1  
MDSE_ACC_DT 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
MDSE_DEL_DT 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
MILPAY 1 1 1 1 1  
MISC_CHG 1 0 0 0 0 Populated with all N/As and only at OA, deleted. 
MISC_OBLIG 1 1 1 1 1  
MULTI_ADDR_K 1 1 1 1 1  
MULTI_ADR 1 1 1 1 1  
MULTI_EFT_K 1 1 1 1 1  
MULTI_PAYEE 1 1 1 1 1  
MULTI_PAYEE_K 1 1 1 1 1  
MULTI_PAYTIN 1 1 1 1 1  
MULTI_TINS 1 1 1 1 1  
MULTI_TINS_K 1 1 1 1 1  

















NEW_ID 1 0 0 0 0 ID numbers only for OA, no value 
NOT_DFAR 0 1 1 1 1 OA Updated from DFAR 
NUM_EE_K 0 1 1 0 1 Transforms only available starting with SA 
NUMADR_K 0 1 1 0 1  
NUMADREE 0 1 1 0 1  
NUMEFT_K 0 1 1 0 1  
NUMEFTEE 0 1 1 0 1  
DOV_NUM 1 0 0 0 1 
seq_id 1 0 0 0 1 
Removed each site prefix. 
OA_IND 1 0 0 0 0 Populated with O, field of no value, deleted. 
ORDER_CDF 1 1 1 1 1  
ORDER_TO_PAY 1 0 0 0 0 Only available at OA, no longer used, deleted. 
OTHERX 1 1 1 1 1  
OVER_BLD 1 0 0 0 0 Populated with all N/As and only at OA, deleted. 
PAY_CMRA_ADR 1 0 0 0 0 Populated with all zeros and only at OA, deleted. 
PAY_ORDER 1 1 1 1 1  
PAYEE 1 1 1 1 1  
PAYEE_4_PYMT 1 1 1 1 1  
PAYEE13 1 1 1 1 1  
PAYMENT 1 1 1 1 1  
PIIN 1 1 1 1 1  
PMT_CAT 1 1 1 1 1  
PMT_FREQ_HI 1 1 1 1 1  
PMT_FREQ_LO 1 1 1 1 1  
PMT_METH 1 1 1 1 1  
PMT_METH_C 1 0 0 0 0 
PMT_METH_D 1 0 0 0 0 
PMT_METH_E 1 0 0 0 0 
PMT_METH_I 1 0 0 0 0 
PMT_METH_NULL 1 0 0 0 0 
PMT_METH_P 1 0 0 0 0 
PMT_METH_R 1 0 0 0 0 
PMT_METH_X 1 0 0 0 0 
Info contained within PMT_METH, extra flags not 
required, deleted. 
PMT_NUM 1 1 1 1 1  
PMT_PROV 1 1 1 1 1  
PMT_PROV_A 1 0 0 0 0 
PMT_PROV_F 1 0 0 0 0 
PMT_PROV_H 1 0 0 0 0 
PMT_PROV_NULL 1 0 0 0 0 



















PMT_PROV_P 1 0 0 0 0 
PMT_PROV_R 1 0 0 0 0 
Info contained within PMT_PROV, extra flags not required, 
deleted.
PMT_TYPE 1 1 1 1 1  
PMT_TYPE_C 1 0 0 0 0 
PMT_TYPE_F 1 0 0 0 0 
PMT_TYPE_NULL 1 0 0 0 0 
PMT_TYPE_P 1 0 0 0 0 
Info contained within PMT_TYPE, extra flags not required, 
deleted. 
POBOX 1 1 1 1 1  
PPA_XMPT 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA, but it is all blanks. 
Pull_Voucher 1 1 1 1 0 All records are Pull_Voucher, deleted. 
REMIT_S 1 0 0 0 1 Populated with all blanks and only at OA, deleted. 
REMIT_TO 1 0 0 0 0 Changed name to RMT_NAME to match other sites. 
RMT_CD 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA, but it is all blanks. 
RMT_CITY 1 1 1 1 1  
RMT_L1 1 1 1 1 1  
RMT_L2 1 1 1 1 1  
RMT_L3 1 1 1 1 1  
RMT_L4 1 1 1 1 1  
RMT_NAME 0 1 1 1 1 OA Updated from REMIT_TO. 
RMT_ST 1 1 1 1 1  
RMT_ZIP 1 1 1 1 1  
RNDM_NUM 1 1 1 1 0 Random number for record selection, deleted. 
SITE_ID 1 1 1 1 1  
STE 1 1 1 1 1  
SUB_DT 1 1 1 1 1  
SYS_DCN 1 1 1 1 1  
SYS_ID 1 1 1 1 1  
SYS_UNQ 1 1 1 0 1 Missing at SD, appears to only be used at SAI, SD all blanks. 
TAX_AMT 1 1 1 1 1  
TEST1 0 1 1 0 0 
TEST2 0 1 1 0 0 
TEST3 0 1 1 0 0 
TEST4 0 1 1 0 0 
TEST5 0 1 1 0 0 
TEST6 0 1 1 0 0 
Only used at SA, populated with all zeros, deleted. 
TIN 1 1 1 1 1  
TINS 1 1 1 1 1  
TRANS_NUM 1 1 1 1 1  
UNUSUAL 1 1 1 1 1  
VE1_CD 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
VE2_CD 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
VE3_CD 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
VE4_CD 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 

















VE_PMT 1 0 0 0 0 Same as VE4_CD, deleted. 
VND_ADR1 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
VND_ADR2 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
VND_ADR3 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
VND_CITY 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
VND_CRED 1 0 0 0 0 Populated with all N/As and only at OA, deleted. 
VND_ID 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
VND_NAME 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
VND_ST 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
VND_TYP 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
VND_ZIP 0 1 1 1 1 Updated OA. 
VOU_ST_B 1 0 0 0 0 
VOU_ST_D 1 0 0 0 0 
VOU_ST_Q 1 0 0 0 0 
VOU_ST_S 1 0 0 0 0 
VOU_ST_V 1 0 0 0 0 
Info contained within VOU_STAT, extra flags not required, 
deleted. 
VOU_STAT 1 1 1 1 1  
VPR_AMT 1 0 0 0 0 Populated with all N/As and only at OA, deleted. 
Y1_CUR 1 1 1 1 1  
Y1_PRIOR 1 1 1 1 1  
Y2_CUR_1ST 1 1 1 1 1  
Y2_CUR_2ND 1 1 1 1 1  
Y2_PRIOR 1 1 1 1 1  
Y3_PLUS 1 1 1 1 1  
d 1 1 1 1 1 Duplicate flag. 
r 1 1 1 1 1 Random flag. 
s 1 1 1 1 1 Supervised flag. 
u 1 1 1 1 1 Unsupervised flag. 
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APPENDIX D. FOUR SITES’ MODEL NAMES AND CNI
CLASSIFICATION RATES
GAMS# Model Model Name Model Classification Rate
1 SD9 kh_sup_9_nn_1_e10 50.8%
2 SD17 bullet_sup_8_c5_2_pe0 49.9%
3 SD19 kh_sup_3_nn_1_sd1 58.4%
4 SD20 cd_sup_1_c5_2_sd1 46.2%
5 SD21 jg_sup_4_nn_2_sd1 59.7%
6 SD22 tc_sup_2_nn_2_sd1 51.2%
7 SD23 tc_sup_8_c5_2_sd1 51.5%
8 SAI1 tc_sup_9_nn_3_oa1_sa1iaps 56.0%
9 SAI2 kh_sup_5_c5_5_oa1_sa1iaps 48.3%
10 SAI3 kh_sup_2_c5_oa1_sa1iaps 50.6%
11 SAI4 kh_sup_11_nn_1_e10_sa1iaps 52.9%
12 SAI5 cd_sup_11_c5_2_oa1_sa1iaps 52.4%
13 SAI6 kh_sup_10_c5_2_oa1_sa1iaps 54.5%
14 SAI7 cd_4_nn_1_sa1iaps 57.7%
15 SAI8 rtf_1_c5_5_sa1iaps 54.7%
16 SAI9 rtf_3_xx_3_sa1iaps 56.3%
17 SAI10 rtf_6_xx_1_sa1iaps 45.1%
18 SAI11 dr_4_dyna_1_sa2iaps 52.6%
19 SAC1 tc_sup_9_nn_3_oa1_sa1caps 55.1%
20 SAC2 kh_sup_5_c5_5_oa1_sa1caps 51.9%
21 SAC3 kh_sup_2_c5_oa1_sa1caps 55.2%
22 SAC4 kh_sup_11_nn_1_e10_sa1caps 52.9%
23 SAC5 cd_sup_11_c5_2_oa1_sa1caps 54.2%
24 SAC6 kh_sup_10_c5_2_oa1_sa1caps 52.8%
25 SAC7 rtf_3_xx_2_sa1caps 52.2%
26 SAC8 rtf_1_c5_5_sa1caps 44.9%
27 SAC9 cd_4_nn_1_sa1caps 51.7%
28 SAC10 cd_7_cd_2_sa1caps 52.9%
29 SAC11 cd_sup_1_nn_4_sa1caps 50.4%
30 OA1 kh_sup_6_nn_5_oa1 48.8%
31 OA2 kh_sup_7_br_5_oa1 63.1%
32 OA3 kh_sup_10_c5_2_oa1 64.5%
33 OA4 kh_sup_5_c5_5_oa1 60.0%
34 OA5 kh_sup_2_c5_5_oa1 52.8%
35 OA6 tc_sup_9_nn_3_oa1 57.5%
36 OA7 cd_sup_11_c5_2_oa1 49.0%
37 OA8 kh_sup_11_nn_1_e10 54.4%
38 OA9 kh_sup_9_nn_1_e10 51.5%
39 OA10 cd_sup_6_nn_2_e10 49.9%
40 OA11 cd_sup_7_c5_2_e10 56.8%
41 OA12 cd_sup_4_nn_4_e10 56.0%
42 OA13 cd_sup_1_c5_1_pe0 49.6%
43 OA14 rtf_sup_2_nn_6_pe0 55.1%
44 OA15 kirby_sup_3_c5_1_pe0 58.4%
45 OA16 yoshi_sup_4_nn_1_pe0 56.1%
46 OA17 peach_sup_5_br_2_pe0 54.7%
47 OA18 kf_sup_6_nn_1_pe0 49.6%
48 OA19 bullet_sup_6_c5_2_pe0 44.2%
49 OA20 bullet_sup_8_c5_2_pe0 50.8%
50 OA21 kf_sup_9_c5_4_pe0 51.7%
51 OA22 kirby_sup_10_nn_6_pe0 50.8%
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APPENDIX E. GAMS CODE FOR OPTIMIZED ENSEMBLE
The code presented here is the GAMS formulation and solution for
determining the optimized model stream using a majority-vote.  There
are solutions for model sizes ranging from 3 to 21 models in an
ensemble.  GAMS model numbers and their respective names and







         SOLPRINT =   OFF,
         DECIMALS =     1,
         LIMCOL   =     0,
         LIMROW   =     0,
         RESLIM   =  750, {max seconds}
         ITERLIM  = 500000, {max pivots}
         OPTCR    =  0.10, {relative integrality tolerance}
         RMIP     =  cplex,
         MIP      =  osl ; {OSL, CPLEX, XA, ... }

 SETS  r           "records"
     / r001*r563 /

       m           "models"
     / m001*m052 /

       cni(r)      "audited records found fraudulent"
     /
$INCLUDE cni.dat
     /
       vote(r,m)  "fraud indications"
     /
$INCLUDE vote.dat
     /;

 PARAMETER audit(r), agree(r,m) ;

 LOOP(r,
   audit(r) = 0 ;
 );
 LOOP(cni(r),
   audit(r) = 1 ;
 );
 LOOP((r,m),
   agree(r,m) = 0 ;
 );
 LOOP(vote(r,m),




   IF( agree(r,m)=audit(r),
      agree(r,m) = 1 ;
   ELSE
      agree(r,m) = 0 ;
   );
 );

 SCALAR enssize , majvotes ;

 VARIABLES
   Z                  fraudulent records found by selected ensemble ;

 BINARY VARIABLES
   CLASSIFY(r)




   OBJECT             objective function
   MAJORITY(r)        majority vote required to classify any record
   ENSEMBLESZ         restrict maximum ensemble size
   ;

 OBJECT..








   SUM(m,SELECT(m)) =l= enssize
 ;
 MODEL FRAUD / ALL /;

For (enssize= 3 to 21 by 2,
   majvotes = FLOOR(enssize/2) + 1 ;
   SOLVE FRAUD USING MIP MAXIMIZING  Z ;
   DISPLAY enssize
   DISPLAY SELECT.l   ;
   );
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------
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LOOPS                            FOR/WHILE   1

MODEL STATISTICS
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS       3     SINGLE EQUATIONS      565
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES       3     SINGLE VARIABLES      616
NON ZERO ELEMENTS     16727     DISCRETE VARIABLES    615

GENERATION TIME      =        0.063 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121
EXECUTION TIME       =        0.297 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121

               S O L V E      S U M M A R Y
     MODEL   FRAUD               OBJECTIVE  Z
     TYPE    MIP                 DIRECTION  MAXIMIZE
     SOLVER  OSL                 FROM LINE  18470

**** SOLVER STATUS     2 ITERATION INTERRUPT
**** MODEL STATUS      8 INTEGER SOLUTION
**** OBJECTIVE VALUE              391.0000

 RESOURCE USAGE, LIMIT        386.391       750.000
 ITERATION COUNT, LIMIT    500012        500000

 OSL Version 1 Mar 21, 2001 WIN.OS.O2 20.0 058.043.039.WAT
 Work space allocated           --    3.65 Mb

 Relaxed optimum objective value:     460.15538
 Bound on best integer solution:      441.25000
 Objective value of this solution:    391.00000

 Relative gap: .11388 Absolute gap:   50.250000
 Optcr       : .10000 Optca:          0.0

 The solution does not satisfy the termination tolerances

**** REPORT SUMMARY :        0     NONOPT
                             0 INFEASIBLE
                             0  UNBOUNDED

E x e c u t i o n
----  18471 PARAMETER enssize              =          3.0

----  18472 VARIABLE  SELECT.L

m021 1.0,    m031 1.0,    m032 1.0
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LOOPS                            FOR/WHILE   2

MODEL STATISTICS
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS       3     SINGLE EQUATIONS      565
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES       3     SINGLE VARIABLES      616
NON ZERO ELEMENTS     16727     DISCRETE VARIABLES    615

GENERATION TIME      =        0.079 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121
EXECUTION TIME       =        0.235 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121

               S O L V E      S U M M A R Y
     MODEL   FRAUD               OBJECTIVE  Z
     TYPE    MIP                 DIRECTION  MAXIMIZE
     SOLVER  OSL                 FROM LINE  18470

**** SOLVER STATUS     2 ITERATION INTERRUPT
**** MODEL STATUS      8 INTEGER SOLUTION
**** OBJECTIVE VALUE              391.0000

 RESOURCE USAGE, LIMIT        388.512       750.000
 ITERATION COUNT, LIMIT    500033        500000

 OSL Version 1 Mar 21, 2001 WIN.OS.O2 20.0 058.043.039.WAT
 Work space allocated           --    3.65 Mb

 Relaxed optimum objective value:     486.35442
 Bound on best integer solution:      473.76190
 Objective value of this solution:    391.00000

 Relative gap: .17469 Absolute gap:   82.761905
 Optcr       : .10000 Optca:          0.0

 The solution does not satisfy the termination tolerances

**** REPORT SUMMARY :        0     NONOPT
                             0 INFEASIBLE
                             0  UNBOUNDED

E x e c u t i o n
----  18471 PARAMETER enssize              =          5.0

----  18472 VARIABLE  SELECT.L

m021 1.0,    m031 1.0,    m032 1.0,    m034 1.0,    m043 1.0
  94
LOOPS                            FOR/WHILE   3

MODEL STATISTICS
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS       3     SINGLE EQUATIONS      565
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES       3     SINGLE VARIABLES      616
NON ZERO ELEMENTS     16727     DISCRETE VARIABLES    615

GENERATION TIME      =        0.063 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121
EXECUTION TIME       =        0.266 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121

               S O L V E      S U M M A R Y
     MODEL   FRAUD               OBJECTIVE  Z
     TYPE    MIP                 DIRECTION  MAXIMIZE
     SOLVER  OSL                 FROM LINE  18470

**** SOLVER STATUS     2 ITERATION INTERRUPT
**** MODEL STATUS      8 INTEGER SOLUTION
**** OBJECTIVE VALUE              398.0000

 RESOURCE USAGE, LIMIT        368.480       750.000
 ITERATION COUNT, LIMIT    500054        500000

 OSL Version 1 Mar 21, 2001 WIN.OS.O2 20.0 058.043.039.WAT
 Work space allocated           --    3.65 Mb

 Relaxed optimum objective value:     497.38410
 Bound on best integer solution:      491.60000
 Objective value of this solution:    398.00000

 Relative gap: .19040 Absolute gap:   93.600000
 Optcr       : .10000 Optca:          0.0

 The solution does not satisfy the termination tolerances

**** REPORT SUMMARY :        0     NONOPT
                             0 INFEASIBLE
                             0  UNBOUNDED

E x e c u t i o n
----  18471 PARAMETER enssize              =          7.0

----  18472 VARIABLE  SELECT.L

m021 1.0,   m030 1.0,   m031 1.0,   m032 1.0,   m033 1.0,   m043 1.0
m049 1.0
  95
LOOPS                            FOR/WHILE   4

MODEL STATISTICS
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS       3     SINGLE EQUATIONS      565
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES       3     SINGLE VARIABLES      616
NON ZERO ELEMENTS     16727     DISCRETE VARIABLES    615

GENERATION TIME      =        0.078 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121
EXECUTION TIME       =        0.235 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121

               S O L V E      S U M M A R Y
     MODEL   FRAUD               OBJECTIVE  Z
     TYPE    MIP                 DIRECTION  MAXIMIZE
     SOLVER  OSL                 FROM LINE  18470

**** SOLVER STATUS     2 ITERATION INTERRUPT
**** MODEL STATUS      8 INTEGER SOLUTION
**** OBJECTIVE VALUE              388.0000

 RESOURCE USAGE, LIMIT        338.451       750.000
 ITERATION COUNT, LIMIT    500008        500000

 OSL Version 1 Mar 21, 2001 WIN.OS.O2 20.0 058.043.039.WAT
 Work space allocated           --    3.65 Mb

 Relaxed optimum objective value:     503.25581
 Bound on best integer solution:      499.41429
 Objective value of this solution:    388.00000

 Relative gap: .22309 Absolute gap:   111.41429
 Optcr       : .10000 Optca:          0.0

 The solution does not satisfy the termination tolerances

**** REPORT SUMMARY :        0     NONOPT
                             0 INFEASIBLE
                             0  UNBOUNDED

E x e c u t i o n
----  18471 PARAMETER enssize              =          9.0

----  18472 VARIABLE  SELECT.L

m002 1.0,   m016 1.0,   m029 1.0,   m030 1.0,   m031 1.0,   m032 1.0
m034 1.0,   m037 1.0,   m043 1.0
  96
 LOOPS                            FOR/WHILE   5

MODEL STATISTICS
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS       3     SINGLE EQUATIONS      565
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES       3     SINGLE VARIABLES      616
NON ZERO ELEMENTS     16727     DISCRETE VARIABLES    615

GENERATION TIME      =        0.078 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121
EXECUTION TIME       =        0.250 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121

               S O L V E      S U M M A R Y
     MODEL   FRAUD               OBJECTIVE  Z
     TYPE    MIP                 DIRECTION  MAXIMIZE
     SOLVER  OSL                 FROM LINE  18470

**** SOLVER STATUS     2 ITERATION INTERRUPT
**** MODEL STATUS      8 INTEGER SOLUTION
**** OBJECTIVE VALUE              398.0000

 RESOURCE USAGE, LIMIT        351.721       750.000
 ITERATION COUNT, LIMIT    500052        500000

 OSL Version 1 Mar 21, 2001 WIN.OS.O2 20.0 058.043.039.WAT
 Work space allocated           --    3.65 Mb

 Relaxed optimum objective value:     505.85574
 Bound on best integer solution:      502.83333
 Objective value of this solution:    398.00000

 Relative gap: .20849 Absolute gap:   104.83333
 Optcr       : .10000 Optca:          0.0

 The solution does not satisfy the termination tolerances

**** REPORT SUMMARY :        0     NONOPT
                             0 INFEASIBLE
                             0  UNBOUNDED

E x e c u t i o n
----  18471 PARAMETER enssize              =         11.0

----  18472 VARIABLE  SELECT.L

m002 1.0,   m003 1.0,   m029 1.0,   m030 1.0,   m031 1.0,   m032 1.0
m033 1.0,   m034 1.0,   m037 1.0,   m043 1.0,   m047 1.0
  97
LOOPS                            FOR/WHILE   6

MODEL STATISTICS
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS       3     SINGLE EQUATIONS      565
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES       3     SINGLE VARIABLES      616
NON ZERO ELEMENTS     16727     DISCRETE VARIABLES    615

GENERATION TIME      =        0.079 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121
EXECUTION TIME       =        0.219 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121

               S O L V E      S U M M A R Y
     MODEL   FRAUD               OBJECTIVE  Z
     TYPE    MIP                 DIRECTION  MAXIMIZE
     SOLVER  OSL                 FROM LINE  18470

**** SOLVER STATUS     2 ITERATION INTERRUPT
**** MODEL STATUS      8 INTEGER SOLUTION
**** OBJECTIVE VALUE              389.0000

 RESOURCE USAGE, LIMIT        346.521       750.000
 ITERATION COUNT, LIMIT    500052        500000

 OSL Version 1 Mar 21, 2001 WIN.OS.O2 20.0 058.043.039.WAT
 Work space allocated           --    3.65 Mb

 Relaxed optimum objective value:     507.02198
 Bound on best integer solution:      505.09524
 Objective value of this solution:    389.00000

 Relative gap: .22985 Absolute gap:   116.09524
 Optcr       : .10000 Optca:          0.0

 The solution does not satisfy the termination tolerances

**** REPORT SUMMARY :        0     NONOPT
                             0 INFEASIBLE
                             0  UNBOUNDED

E x e c u t i o n
----  18471 PARAMETER enssize              =         13.0

----  18472 VARIABLE  SELECT.L

m003 1.0,   m029 1.0,   m030 1.0,   m031 1.0,   m032 1.0,   m033 1.0
m034 1.0,   m036 1.0,   m037 1.0,   m039 1.0,   m043 1.0,   m049 1.0
m051 1.0
  98
 LOOPS                            FOR/WHILE   7

MODEL STATISTICS
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS       3     SINGLE EQUATIONS      565
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES       3     SINGLE VARIABLES      616
NON ZERO ELEMENTS     16727     DISCRETE VARIABLES    615

GENERATION TIME      =        0.078 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121
EXECUTION TIME       =        0.218 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121

               S O L V E      S U M M A R Y
     MODEL   FRAUD               OBJECTIVE  Z
     TYPE    MIP                 DIRECTION  MAXIMIZE
     SOLVER  OSL                 FROM LINE  18470

**** SOLVER STATUS     2 ITERATION INTERRUPT
**** MODEL STATUS      8 INTEGER SOLUTION
**** OBJECTIVE VALUE              382.0000

 RESOURCE USAGE, LIMIT        333.891       750.000
 ITERATION COUNT, LIMIT    500078        500000

 OSL Version 1 Mar 21, 2001 WIN.OS.O2 20.0 058.043.039.WAT
 Work space allocated           --    3.65 Mb

 Relaxed optimum objective value:     507.20625
 Bound on best integer solution:      505.68750
 Objective value of this solution:    382.00000

 Relative gap: .24459 Absolute gap:   123.68750
 Optcr       : .10000 Optca:          0.0

 The solution does not satisfy the termination tolerances

**** REPORT SUMMARY :        0     NONOPT
                             0 INFEASIBLE
                             0  UNBOUNDED

E x e c u t i o n
----  18471 PARAMETER enssize              =         15.0

----  18472 VARIABLE  SELECT.L

m002 1.0,   m003 1.0,   m006 1.0,   m029 1.0,   m030 1.0,   m031 1.0
m032 1.0,   m033 1.0,   m034 1.0,   m036 1.0,   m037 1.0,   m039 1.0
m043 1.0,   m049 1.0,   m051 1.0
  99
 LOOPS                            FOR/WHILE   8

MODEL STATISTICS
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS       3     SINGLE EQUATIONS      565
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES       3     SINGLE VARIABLES      616
NON ZERO ELEMENTS     16727     DISCRETE VARIABLES    615

GENERATION TIME      =        0.078 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121
EXECUTION TIME       =        0.281 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121

               S O L V E      S U M M A R Y
     MODEL   FRAUD               OBJECTIVE  Z
     TYPE    MIP                 DIRECTION  MAXIMIZE
     SOLVER  OSL                 FROM LINE  18470

**** SOLVER STATUS     2 ITERATION INTERRUPT
**** MODEL STATUS      8 INTEGER SOLUTION
**** OBJECTIVE VALUE              377.0000

 RESOURCE USAGE, LIMIT        326.520       750.000
 ITERATION COUNT, LIMIT    500084        500000

 OSL Version 1 Mar 21, 2001 WIN.OS.O2 20.0 058.043.039.WAT
 Work space allocated           --    3.65 Mb

 Relaxed optimum objective value:     503.52849
 Bound on best integer solution:      502.33333
 Objective value of this solution:    377.00000

 Relative gap: .24950 Absolute gap:   125.33333
 Optcr       : .10000 Optca:          0.0

 The solution does not satisfy the termination tolerances

**** REPORT SUMMARY :        0     NONOPT
                             0 INFEASIBLE
                             0  UNBOUNDED

E x e c u t i o n
----  18471 PARAMETER enssize              =         17.0

----  18472 VARIABLE  SELECT.L

m002 1.0,   m003 1.0,   m019 1.0,   m029 1.0,   m030 1.0,   m031 1.0
m032 1.0,   m033 1.0,   m034 1.0,   m036 1.0,   m037 1.0,   m039 1.0
m043 1.0,   m047 1.0,   m048 1.0,   m049 1.0,   m052 1.0
  100
LOOPS                            FOR/WHILE   9

MODEL STATISTICS
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS       3     SINGLE EQUATIONS      565
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES       3     SINGLE VARIABLES      616
NON ZERO ELEMENTS     16727     DISCRETE VARIABLES    615

GENERATION TIME      =        0.062 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121
EXECUTION TIME       =        0.265 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121

               S O L V E      S U M M A R Y
     MODEL   FRAUD               OBJECTIVE  Z
     TYPE    MIP                 DIRECTION  MAXIMIZE
     SOLVER  OSL                 FROM LINE  18470

**** SOLVER STATUS     2 ITERATION INTERRUPT
**** MODEL STATUS      8 INTEGER SOLUTION
**** OBJECTIVE VALUE              373.0000

 RESOURCE USAGE, LIMIT        327.221       750.000
 ITERATION COUNT, LIMIT    500036        500000

 OSL Version 1 Mar 21, 2001 WIN.OS.O2 20.0 058.043.039.WAT
 Work space allocated           --    3.65 Mb

 Relaxed optimum objective value:     498.56604
 Bound on best integer solution:      497.49512
 Objective value of this solution:    373.00000

 Relative gap: .25024 Absolute gap:   124.49512
 Optcr       : .10000 Optca:          0.0

 The solution does not satisfy the termination tolerances

**** REPORT SUMMARY :        0     NONOPT
                             0 INFEASIBLE
                             0  UNBOUNDED

E x e c u t i o n
----  18471 PARAMETER enssize              =         19.0

----  18472 VARIABLE  SELECT.L

m002 1.0,   m005 1.0,   m015 1.0,   m017 1.0,   m019 1.0,   m021 1.0
m029 1.0,   m030 1.0,   m031 1.0,   m032 1.0,   m033 1.0,   m034 1.0
m035 1.0,   m036 1.0,   m037 1.0,   m039 1.0,   m043 1.0,   m047 1.0
m051 1.0
  101
LOOPS                            FOR/WHILE   10

MODEL STATISTICS
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS       3     SINGLE EQUATIONS      565
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES       3     SINGLE VARIABLES      616
NON ZERO ELEMENTS     16727     DISCRETE VARIABLES    615

GENERATION TIME      =        0.078 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121
EXECUTION TIME       =        0.235 SECONDS    2.4 Mb      WIN200-121

               S O L V E      S U M M A R Y
     MODEL   FRAUD               OBJECTIVE  Z
     TYPE    MIP                 DIRECTION  MAXIMIZE
     SOLVER  OSL                 FROM LINE  18470

**** SOLVER STATUS     2 ITERATION INTERRUPT
**** MODEL STATUS      8 INTEGER SOLUTION
**** OBJECTIVE VALUE              372.0000

 RESOURCE USAGE, LIMIT        375.900       750.000
 ITERATION COUNT, LIMIT    500001        500000

 OSL Version 1 Mar 21, 2001 WIN.OS.O2 20.0 058.043.039.WAT
 Work space allocated           --    3.65 Mb

 Relaxed optimum objective value:     491.86096
 Bound on best integer solution:      490.95455
 Objective value of this solution:    372.00000

 Relative gap: .24229 Absolute gap:   118.95455
 Optcr       : .10000 Optca:          0.0

 The solution does not satisfy the termination tolerances

**** REPORT SUMMARY :        0     NONOPT
                             0 INFEASIBLE
                             0  UNBOUNDED

E x e c u t i o n
----  18471 PARAMETER enssize              =         21.0

----  18472 VARIABLE  SELECT.L

m003 1.0,   m007 1.0,   m015 1.0,   m017 1.0,   m021 1.0,   m029 1.0
m030 1.0,   m031 1.0,   m032 1.0,   m033 1.0,   m034 1.0,   m035 1.0
m036 1.0,   m037 1.0,   m042 1.0,   m043 1.0,   m046 1.0,   m047 1.0
m049 1.0,   m050 1.0,   m051 1.0

USER: Course License                                 G020111:1129AP-WIN




INPUT      C:\WINDOWS\GAMSDIR\FRAUD3.GMS
OUTPUT     C:\WINDOWS\GAMSDIR\FRAUD3.LST
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